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ENGLAND LIMITS THE RIGHT TO





Britain's Parliament has adopted Prime Minister John Major's
proposal to significantly curtail the right to silence.1 The new law will
allow judges and juries to consider as evidence of guilt both a sus-
pect's failure to answer police questions during interrogation and a
defendant's refusal to testify during trial.2 Supporters of the new law
had argued that change was greatly needed because the right to si-
lence was "a charade which [has been] 'ruthlessly exploited by ter-
* Criminal Justice Counsel, Office of the Cook County Public Defender; J.D., Loyola
University School of Law, 1984; MA., Loyola University, Chicago, 1985.
1 Royal Assent, Nov. 3, 1994, effective March 1, 1995. In England, until Major's
amendment, the right to silence provided that: "The failure of an accused person when
questioned to mention some fact which he afterwards relies on in his defense cannot
found an inference that the explanation subsequently advanced is untrue, for the accused
has a right to remain silent. ... The failure of the accused to testify on his own behalf may
not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution.... The judge may, in an
appropriate case, make a comment.., but he should make it clear to the jury that failure
to testify is not evidence of guilt and that the accused is entitled to remain silent and see if
the prosecution can prove its case." 11(2) HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 937-38 (1990)
(citations omitted). The right to silence is protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States: "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. It has also been adopted in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter "Covenant"), which pro-
vides that "everyone shall be entitled.., not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt." Art. 14 (3) (g), 61 I.L.M. 368, 372 (1967). Both the United States and the
United Kingdom have, by treaty, adopted the Covenant. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 343 (June 1993). The treaty entered into force for the United States on
Sept. 8, 1992. 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992).
2 The CriminalJustice and Public Order Act, 1994 Part III, §§ 27-31 (Eng.) [hereinaf-
ter Public Order Act]; Heather Mills, Tougher Policies Aimed at Helping Victims of Crime, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 19, 1993, at 6; Michael Zander, Abandoning an Ancient Right to
Please the Police, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 6, 1993, at 25 (editorial); Howard's Begin-
ning, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 1993, at 17 (editorial); British Rights Groups Criticize New
Crime Bil, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1993, § 1, at 18.
RIGHT TO SILENCE
rorists."'3 Proponents had also diminished the significance of the
proposed changes, contending that the accused's silence will simply
become "an item of evidence... scarcely a major infringement of a
defendant's liberty ... [and that the change] . . .should dissuade
offenders from thwarting prosecution simply by saying nothing."4
These views, however, contradicted the conclusions of two publi-
cations released by the Royal Commission on Criminal justice in
19935 and spurred the vocal opposition of a number of groups. Those
who opposed Major's proposal noted that even the innocent have
valid reasons for remaining silent, and that the proposal would not
reduce crime,6 but would increase the likelihood of false confessions
and erroneous convictions. 7 Those opposed to Major's proposal also
argued that it would undermine the presumption of innocence and
erode England's accusatorial system ofjustice.8
Major's new law will curtail the right to silence by allowing judges
and jurors to draw adverse inferences when a suspect remains silent.
It is the latest in a series of similar proposals by English police and
politicians, 9 and it adopts restrictions on the right to silence which
Parliament imposed on Northern Ireland in 1988.10 The new law con-
tains four parts: (1) judges and jurors may draw adverse inferences
3 Mills, supra note 2, at 6.
4 Howard's Beginning supra note 2, at 17.
5 'Tim ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMrNALJUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2263 [hereinafter
REPORT]; ROGER LENG, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINALJUsTcE, RESEARCH STUDY No.
10, 1993 [hereinafter LENG].
6 The Right to Silence, THE ECONOMIsr, Jan. 29, 1994, at 17 (editorial).
7 Reasons for silence include "the protection of family or friends, a sense of bewilder-
ment, embarrassment or outrage, or a reasoned decision to wait until the allegation against
them has been set out in detail and they have had the benefit of considered legal advice."
REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
8 Zander, supra note 2, at 25 (The right to silence is "based on the presumption of
innocence, and reflects the burden thrown on the prosecution to prove the defendant
guilty, without any assistance from the defendant if he so chooses"); John Jackson, Infer-
ences from Silence: From Common Law to Common Sense, 44 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 103, 108
(1993) (The use of adverse inferences after the prosecution has established only a prima
facie case shifts a burden to the accused to testify or have his silence aid the prosecution in
carrying its burden of proof. This violates the accusatorial principle that it is the prosecu-
tion's duty to prove the accused's guilt.); The Right to Silence, supra note 6, at 17 (editorial
taking issue with the move to curtail the right to silence, arguing that it is an assault on the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof).
9 CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM., ELEvENTH REPORT ON EVIDENCE (GENERAL), Cmnd.
4991, 11 28-45 (1972) (describing similar proposals); see also THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, 1981, Cmnd 8092, 1 4.51 (Jan. 1981) (rejecting a similar proposal
as contrary to a central element of the accusatorial system-that the prosecution bears the
burden of proof).
10 The Criminal Evidence (N.I.) Order [hereinafter Order], enacted Nov. 14, 1988, eff.
Dec. 15, 1988, cited inJ.D. Jackson, Curtailing the Right to Silence: Lessons from Northern Ire-
land, 1991 CIuM. L. REv. 404, 405.
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when suspects do not tell the police during interrogation a fact relied
upon by the defense at trial if, under the circumstances, the suspect
could have been expected to mention the fact; (2) if the accused does
not testify, judges and prosecutors may invite the jury to make any
inference which to them appears proper-including the "common
sense" inference that there is no explanation for the evidence pro-
duced against the accused and that the accused is guilty;" (3) judges
and jurors may draw an adverse inference when suspects fail to re-
spond to police questions about any suspicious objects, substances, or
marks which are found on their persons or clothing or in the place
where they were arrested; and (4) judges and jurors may draw adverse
inferences if suspects do not explain to the police why they were pres-
ent at a place at or about the time of the offense for which they were
arrested. 1
2
The new law purports to control crime by curtailing the right to
silence, forcing suspects to confess, and thereby increasing convic-
tions. While similar proposals have surfaced with great fanfare in the
past, and have been adopted in Northern Ireland and Singapore,
there is little or no evidence that they reduce crime.'5 Police failure
to obtain confessions has not lead to the release of significant num-
bers of criminals. In fact, only a small percentage of suspects fail to
answer police questions, and evidence reviewed by the Royal Commis-
sion suggests that they are convicted at a slightly higher rate than sus-
pects who answer police questions.1 4 Moreover, even if Major's new
law increases confessions and convictions, it will not reduce crime, be-
cause if the criminal justice system has a failing, it is not found in the
low percentage of cases lost in courts, but in the high percentage of
cases where the criminal is never caught. For example, while only
twelve percent of reported crimes end up in court, over ninety per-
cent of those cases end in conviction.15 Even if Major's new law does
not follow the pattern of similar proposals, and succeeds in incre-
11 See infra notes 154 to 155.
12 Public Order Act, supra note 2, §§ 34-37. Compare Order, supra note 10.
13 See infra notes 118 to 136 and accompanying text; David Dixon, Politics, Research, and
Symbolism in Criminal Justice: The Right to Silence and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 20
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 27 (1991); Jackson, supra note 10; Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the
Right to Silence: The Singapore Experience, 1983 CiM. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (no evidence that
adverse inferences increased confessions).
14 A study by the Royal Commission found that suspects remained silent in 4.5% of
cases in which interviews took place. LENG, supra note 5, at 17. According to a study cited
in another report of the Royal Commission, 41% of those who had been silent were acquit-
ted compared to 49% of those who had answered police questions. REPORT, supra note 5,
at 53 (citing T. Williamson & S. Moston, The Extent of Silence in Police Intenviews, in THE
RIGHT OF SILENCE DEBATE (Steven Greer & R. Morgan eds., 1990)).
15 The Right to Silence, supra note 6, at 18.
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mentally raising the number of confessions and the conviction rate, it
will do nothing about the vastly greater number of cases where no
suspect is caught. Indeed, the Royal Commission concluded that ad-
verse inferences would increase neither confessions nor convictions. 16
The lack of evidence supporting the use of adverse inferences as a
means of controlling crime has not deterred supporters of such meas-
ures in England, or even in the United States. 17 Given that the ability
of Major's new law to control crime is questionable, perhaps its appeal
is purely symbolic.' 8
Forcing or strongly inducing suspects to talk, however, has practi-
cal consequences. The new law could prompt false confessions by
weak suspects and erroneous convictions of those who, although inno-
cent, failed to offer cogent explanations for their behavior or who be-
came confused. More significantly, curtailing the right to remain
silent will shift the criminal justice system from its accusatorial focus on
proof by witnesses and extrinsic evidence, to an inquisitorial focus on
the interrogation of suspects to gain evidence of their guilt. This
change will undermine the accusatorial system ofjustice, jeopardizing
many of its benefits. Among these benefits is the foundation of an
open and democratic society-a strictly limited government, re-
strained in its ability to compromise individual dignity, privacy, and
autonomy. Such a move is inconsistent with the inherent distrust of
authority which helped shape limited and democratic govemment.'9
16 LENG, supra note 5, at 79-80.
17 Major's plan was releasedjust months after the Royal Commission issued two reports
which indicated that adverse inferences would not produce the benefits suggested by pro-
ponents and discussed the problem which could result if the use of adverse inferences was
adopted. REPORT, supra note 5; LENo, supra note 5. See also United States Dept. ofJustice,
Office of Legal Policy, Adverse Inferences from Silence, 22 U. MICH. J.L. Rr. 1005, 1120-21
(1989) (part of the Department's "Truth in Justice" series, this paper suggests adopting
adverse inferences from silence in the United States to remove a "shelter" for the guilty
and provide an incentive to the accused to testify); David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a
Treasure Hun N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE, Dec. 11, 1994, at 70, 73 (Justice Department drafts a
proposal to allow adverse inferences to be used against persons whose property is subject to
forfeiture in drug cases).
18 Dixon, supra note 13, at 32-34 (discussing proposals to curtail the right to silence in
the context of the symbolism of legal reforms). See also Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A
Review of the Current Debate, 53 MOD. L. REv. 709, 724 (1990) (discussing the symbolic im-
portance of the right to silence and of the moves to curtail the right).
19 1 WAYNE LAFAvE & JEROLD IsRAEL, CmMINAL PROCEDuRE § 1.6 (1984). MIRJAN R.
DAmAsxA, THE FAcEs OF JusTicE AND STATE AuTHoRnT 90-91, 164-65 (1986). Professor
Damaska has noted that both England and the United States have traditionally limited the
state to a modest role in managing society, relying instead -on the capitalist system and
voluntary associations. In such a system, justice primarily serves to mediate conflicts be-
tween citizens or associations. But by contrast, in activist states, justice serves state policy,
and neither privacy nor autonomyjustifies a citizen's failure to cooperate during interroga-




England's new limits to the right to silence could influence policy
in the United States. One cannot escape the significance of the fact
that, as Ronald Dworkin noted, "the ancient right [to silence] is about
to be extinguished in the nation which invented it."20 Moreover, unlike
Singapore, which has adopted similar limits, Britain is a democracy; it
has not become a police state, and citizens may still criticize the gov-
ernment.2 1 This democratic context makes the new limits on the
right to silence appear more credible and less extreme.
Like their counterparts in England, some American law enforce-
ment officials have advocated limiting the right to silence. For in-
stance, in 1989, the United States Department of Justice advocated
adopting a litigation strategy to urge the Supreme Court to allow ad-
verse inferences from silence to remove a "shelter" for the guilty and
provide an incentive for the accused to testify.2 2 Others have deni-
grated the right to silence as a "relic of the Star Chamber" which is no
longer relevant in today's criminal justice system and have advocated
limiting the right, and adopting the inquisitorial system of justice in
the United States. 23 Advocates of this view could find a responsive
audience in the United States, as the press, the public, and politicians
focus on crime and an extraordinary array of proposals aimed at its
control.2 4 Thus, England's attempt to control crime by limiting the
right to silence merits close study, especially in light of the potentially
fundamental impact of such a change on the American system of
20 RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF'RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 9 (1990) (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 1; Merril Goozner, Behind its Crisp Exterior, Singapore Runs on Fear, CH. TRIm.,
Apr. 25, 1994, § 1, at 1 (detailing limits on political dissent and expression in Singapore).
22 United States Dept. ofJustice, Office of Legal Policy, supra note 17, at 1120-21. Be-
cause the right to silence is protected by the Fifth Amendment, the paper urged adopting a
strategy to persuade the Supreme Court to allow adverse inferences. In England, by con-
trast, there is no Bill of Rights, and Parliamentary action is supreme. An act of Parliament
limiting the right to silence is therefore not appealable to any court. Anupam Chander,
Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L. J.
457 (1991); DwoRKIN, supra note 20, at 9.
23 Charles Maechling, Jr., Truth in Prosecuting Borrowing From Europe's Civil Law Tradi-
tion, A.B.A.J. 59, 60 (Jan. 1991).
24 Tom Brazaitis, Americans Brutalized by Crime Statistics, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22,
1993, at C2; David Broder, Congress Passes Off Political Rhetoric as Crime-Fighting, CHI. TRiB.,
Jan. 26, 1994, § 4, at 17; Marco R. della Cava, BrutalReality Hits Home in Denver, USA TODAY,
Oct. 28, 1993, at ID; Francis X. Clines, As Gunfire Gets Closer, Fear Comes Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1993, § 4, at 1; Ted Gest et al., Violence in America, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan.
17, 1994, at 22; GOP: Stiffer Prison Terms Needed, CHI. TRi.,Jan. 27, 1994, § 1, at 12; Charles
M. Madigan, Law-and-Order Responses Failing to Root Out Causes, CM. TRIB., Nov. 28, 1993,
§ 4, at 1; Sam V. Meddis, "Brutalized" Public Lives with Growing Fear, USA TODAY, Oct. 28,
1993, at 6A; Sam V. Meddis & Robert Davis, Poll: Get Tougher on Crime, USA TODAY, Oct. 28,
1993, at IA; Elaine Povich, It's a Federal Offense, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1993, § 4, at 1; Katha-
rine Seelye, House Takes Up Measures to Provide Billions More to Fight Crime and Build Prisons,




II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND THE
ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
The development of the right to silence in England spanned hun-
dreds of years25 and was intimately tied to the great struggle between
rival systems of criminal procedure-the accusatorial common law
courts and the inquisitorial ecclesiastical courts.26 These systems were
fundamentally divided on a key method of investigation and adjudica-
tion: reliance on the accused to furnish testimonial evidence of their
guilt. The common law courts disfavored this method and came to
rely primarily upon independent evidence. By contrast, confession
was the essential component of the inquisitorial system employed by
the ecclesiastical courts. In the battle between these systems, the com-
mon law system has maintained the upper hand in England and has
helped shape that nation's-and later the United States'-system of
limited, democratic government 27  and accusatorial criminal
procedure.2
8
25 ProfessorJohn Henry Wigmore and Professor Leonard Levy trace this struggle back
to the early 1200s. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FiFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SEu_-INCRIMINATION 13-24 (2d ed. 1986); 8JonN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW 269-70 (John T. McNaughton Rev. 1961).
26 Wigmore divides this process into two phases. During the first phase, from about the
1200s into the 1600s, individuals used the right to silence as a defense when forced by
ecclesiastical courts to take the oath ex officio and accuse themselves of offenses. During
the second phase, beginning in the early 1600s, accused persons began to assert the right
to remain silent when asked incriminating questions in common law courts. WIGMORE,
supra note 25, at 269-70; see also LEVY, supra note 25, at 13-24; 1 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE
421 (John W. Strong ed., Practitioner Treatise Series, 4th ed. 1992). See infra notes 63-86
and accompanying text for discussion of the fight against the oath not only in the common
law courts, but in the Crown's prerogative courts of the Star Chamber and the High
Commission.
27 For example, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Crown's preroga-
tive courts, the High Commission, and the court of the Star Chamber ignored common law
and Parliament's laws and forced testimony through the oath ex officio. Many of those sub-
jected to this procedure challenged the authority of the prerogative courts to assert such
power by appealing to the common law courts. Some succeeded by obtaining writs of
prohibition from common law judges, including Lord Coke. In Coke's time, however,
King James' assertion of the supremacy of the Crown over the law, capsulized by his aid
Ellesmere as rex est lex loquens (the King is the law speaking) won out, and Coke was forced
to retire from the bench. LEVY, supra note 25, at 229-55.
28 According to Wigmore, this struggle was "composed in part of the inventions of the
early canonists, of the momentous contest between the courts of the common law and of
the church, and of the political and religious issues of that convulsive period in English
history, the days of the dictatorial Stuarts." WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 269; see generally
LEVY, supra note 25.
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A. RIVAL SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Until early in the thirteenth century, both systems relied upon
trial by compurgational oath and trial by ordeal, including ordeal by
battle, as methods of adjudication.29 By early in the thirteenth cen-
tury, trial by compurgational oath or "cononical purgation," had
fallen into disuse as it had become little more than a corrupt swearing
contest. Under this method, the accused, often with the support of
others, would take an oath of denial. Although in earlier times sup-
porters had to have personal knowledge of the event at issue, this
requirement fell by the wayside; instead, arcane and complex forms of
oath came into use. If the swearer erred, the oath was considered
"burst," and the swearer's falseness was revealed.3 0 Until early in the
thirteenth century, trial by ordeal was the primary method of adjudi-
cation. Its verdicts were considered just because the result of the
ordeal was viewed as a divine judgment.31 In 1215, however, the
Fourth Lateran Council removed this divine rationale and barred the
clergy from administering ordeals.32 This helped prompt both sys-
tems to find new methods of adjudication.33
The division between the two systems became pronounced early
in the thirteenth century, a period when both common law and eccle-
siastical courts maintained spheres ofjurisdiction in England.3 4 While
most offenses were tried in common law courts, ecclesiastical courts
had wide jurisdiction and were not limited to what people today might
consider religious affairs. For instance, they tried cases involving "sins
of the flesh" such as fornication and adultery, and miscellaneous of-
fenses such as usury, disorderly conduct, and drunkenness.3 5 Early in
the fourteenth century, attempts were made to limit the ecclesiastical
courts' jurisdiction over laymen to matrimonial and testamentary mat-
ters. These limits did not, however, remain fixed and were not rigidly
enforced. 36 Consequently, the ecclesiastical courts continued to
touch the lives of many ordinary citizens.
29 Lavy, supra note 25, at 9-14.
30 Id. at 5-6, 9.
31 Id. at 9-14.
32 Id. at 14.
33 WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 273 (the ecclesiastical courts also employed compurga-
tional oaths. As in the common law courts, these came to be little more-than a farce).
34 Id. at 270-71 (the history of the development of the right to silence begins in the
early 1200s, a period when the ecclesiastical courts still maintained a large jurisdiction and
influence).
35 LEvy, supra note 25, at 43-44.
36 See WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 271 (citing "De Articulis Cleri," 1 Statutes 209, 2 Inst.
600 (Lord Coke)) (the limit on ecclesiastical jurisdiction did not remain fixed and was a
contentious issue for hundreds of years).
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In common law courts, trial by ordeal waned early in the thir-
teenth century and was replaced by early forms of trial byjury. In the
first phase of these early trials, the jury of "presentment" decided
whether there was sufficient evidence to put a person on trial.37 This
guaranteed the right, established in Magna Carta, not'to be put on
trial without first being charged by credible witnesses.38 Until the six-
teenth century, the presenting jury was comprised of local persons
who often had personal- knowledge of the charge.3 9
In making what amounted to a charging decision, the jury of pre-
sentment could not interrogate accused persons or call them to take
an oath. This rule was summarized in a famous maxim: "No one is
bound to inform against himself. . . but, when exposed by public
repute ([ama), he is held (tenetur) and permitted (licet) to show, if he
can, his innocence and purge himself [by taking a purgation oath]."4°
Some commentators, including Wigmore, have argued that during
the early development of the jury trial, the right to silence only ap-
plied to this initial phase of the criminal process, and not to
adjudication.
4'
A presenting jury originally decided only if there was a common
belief in the accused's guilt. If so, a formal charge would be made
and the accused would stand trial. It did not decide guilt or inno-
cence.42 Since abolition of ordeals in the thirteenth century elimi-
nated the primary method of adjudication, judges began to fill the
gap by asking presenting juries to adjudicate guilt and enter verdicts,
often after adding other members of the community to the jury.43 Al-
lowing the same jury which had already decided to make an accusa-
tion also to decide guilt or innocence was deemed unfair.
37 Law, supra note 25, at 15-17.
38 Chapter 28 of Magna Carta provided that: "No Bailiff from henceforth shall put any
man to his open Law, nor to an Oath, upon his own bare faying, without faithful Witneffes
brought in for the fame." 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE END OF
THE ELEvENTH PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN, ANNO 1761 10 (1762). For a general discus-
sion, see LEw, supra note 25, at 14.
39 Law, supra note 25, at 15, 35.
40 Lavy supra note 25, at 5-6, 9; WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 268-69 n.1 (2). The require-
ment that public repute first be established was honored in the breach: "(I)n England, ex
officio procedure as practiced recognized little necessity of presentment by 'common re-
port' or 'violent suspicion.'" Mary Hume Maguire, Attack of the Common Lauyers on the Oath
Ex Officio as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in EssAYs IN HisTORy AND
PoLrrcA. THEORY 199, 203 (1936).
41 In the view of some commentators, such as Wigmore, during the thirteenth century,
common law did not differ from the inquisitorial .system in its use of the oath; the two
systems differed merely about who should have the right to put someone under oath and
how it should be done. WiGMORE, supra note 25, at 271.
42 LEVY, supra note 25, at 15.
43 Id. at 16.
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Consequently, two separate juries developed-a presenting jury and a
trial jury-and the accused were given the right to challenge trial ju-
rors as personal enemies or false accusers. 44 By 1352, the accused also
had the right to challenge jurors to assure that they were not generally
predisposed to convict and that they would render a fair decision.
Within another century, the jury evolved from a collection of well-
informed witnesses to an independent and disinterested decision-
maker which based its judgement on evidence presented in court,
rather than on personal knowledge.
45
The ecclesiastical courts' new method of investigation and adjudi-
cation was the inquisitorial oath, with which they attempted to elicit a
confession from the suspect and use it as the primary form of evi-
dence. According to Professor Levy, this method grew out of the ec-
clesiastical inquest. Such an inquest was based on interrogating
persons under oath. For example, a traveling bishop charged with
rooting out heresy would put parishioners under oath and closely
question them to obtain denunciations of heretics. Initially, the inves-
tigating bishop could not adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused.46 This changed in approximately 1200 when Pope Innocent III
extended the bishops' role to adjudication.
47
The move toward the use of inquisitorial methods in the ecclesi-
astical courts accelerated when the Fourth Lateran Council elimi-
nated the ordeal as a form of adjudication and filled the gap with
three new methods of investigation and adjudication, each of which
relied on the inquisitorial oath.48 The first method, the accusatio, was
the old method of adjudication where private persons voluntarily ac-
cused others, took on the burden of proving their accusation, and also
accepted the risk of being punished if they failed. The second
method, the denunciato, also used a private accuser, but eliminated the
burdens and risks by allowing that person to act essentially as an in-
former who secretly denounced the accused to a judge, who then ac-
ted as a prosecutor. In the third method, the inquisitio, the judge
acted as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury.
49
Inquisitorial procedures set almost no limit on who ajudge could
imprison and put to an inquisition. A judge required only that "in-
famia'-infamy or a bad reputation-attached to the suspect. This
44 Id. at 16-18.
45 Id. at 18-19.
46 Id. at 22.
47 Id.
48 The Fourth Lateran Council also ratified the bishops' role in adjudication. Id. at 22;
Wigmore, supra note 25, at 275 n.28.
49 LEVY, supra note 25, at 23; WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 275 (the inquisitio "became a
favorite one for heresy trials").
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could be established by common report (fama), notorious suspicion
(clamosa insinuatio), or even by the judge's own suspicions.50 In prac-
tice,judges usually ignored even these weak limits on putting a person
through an inquisition.51 The absence of evidence at this stage was no
impediment since the system relied on the next stage, the inquisitorial
process, to extract the evidence from the mouth of the accused.
At the start of inquisitorial proceedings the accused was forced to
take an oath de veritate dicenda, to answer all questions honestly. This
oath was designed to induce self-incrimination, because confession
was the engine of the inquisitorial process. The chance that anything
the accused said could be construed or twisted to mean something
incriminating was greatly improved because the accused wa kept ig-
norant of the charges, the accusers, and the evidence. If the content
of the accused's statement could not, itself, convict the accused of a
crime, it still might subject him to punishment for perjury. While the
hazards of taking the oath seem overwhelming, the suspects had no
choice. If they did not take the oath, they could be considered guilty
pro confesso, as if they had confessed,52 or they could be imprisoned for
contempt. In some cases, suspects faced the threat of imprisonment
for life if they remained silent.53 In England, the oath de veritate
dicenda became known as the oath ex officio-because in the proceed-
ings a judge served ex officio as accuser, indictor, and convictor.
54
While objections to the oath and inquisitorial methods quickly
developed, England did not enforce the accusatorial system for hun-
dreds of years. In 1246, the zealous Bishop of Lincoln administered
the oath to investigate and prosecute sexual misconduct. This effort
provoked protests strong enough to move Henry III to order local
Sheriffs to bar the use of the oath in all but matrimonial and testa-
mentary cases.55 Early in the next century, Parliament adopted this
prohibition. Despite such formal prohibitions, the church continued
to use the oath to root out heretics and enforce religious orthodoxy,
first by the Catholic church, and later by the Anglican establishment
and the Crown.
56
By the sixteenth century, significant opposition to the oath and
50 Law, supra note 25, at 24.
51 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. "[I] n England, ex officio procedure as prac-
ticed recognized little necessity of presentment by 'common report' or 'violent suspicion.'"
Maguire, supra note 40, at 203.
52 Law, supra note 25, at 23-24. The accused of that age also took seriously the threat
of damnation for lying under oath. Id.
53 Id. at 132, 142-43, 150, 156, 179.
54 Id. at 24.
55 Id. at 47.
56 Id. at 47-48, 63-69.
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inquisitorial methods began to develop. In 1525, William Tyndale
published the first New Testament in English, in which he highlighted
with commentary a section from Matthew condemning oaths, and
urged opposition to them. In 1528, he expanded on his views in a
tract condemning the oath as a violation of a person's conscience. 5
7
In 1532, John Lambert, in fighting a heresy prosecution, was possibly
the first person to decry the oath as illegal. He argued that no one
could be forced to take the oath without first being charged by credi-
ble witnesses through a jury of presentment-58 That year, the
respected lawyer and scholar Christopher St. Germain also published
a tract attacking the ecclesiastical courts in general, and the oath in
particula-. He argued for the supremacy of the common law over ca-
non law, and alleged that the oath unfairly forced the accused to tes-
tify without proper accusation and put the innocent at risk more than
the guilty.59 Finally, that year, Parliament petitioned the King for re-
dress from the oath, objecting to its imposition before fair and open
accusation, and to its use before the accused was shown clear
charges. 60
In the mid-sixteenth century, the struggle between officials who
sought to use the oath and individuals who asserted a right to silence
shifted its main battleground from the religious arena to the center of
the political stage, as religious revolutions swept England. Ecclesiasti-
cal matters became matters of state when Henry VIII formed the
Anglican church, installed himself at its head, and denied the author-
ity of Rome. After Henry, Mary's reign brought a violent reaction, as
she swung England back to Catholicism. Just as violent were Eliza-
beth's efforts to bring the church back under the Crown's authority.
6'
57 Tyndale translated Matthew as follows: "it was said to them of old tyme, thou shalt
not forswere thysilfe, but shalt performe thine othe to god. But I saye unto you, swere not
at all. . . ." Id. at 62-63. McCormick cites St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews as a possible
biblical source of the right to silence: "I don't tell you to display that [your sin] before the
public like a decoration, nor to accuse yourself in front of others." McCoRMICK ON EvI-
DENCE, supra note 26, at 421 n.2 (alteration in original).
58 LEvy, supra note 25, at 62. See supra notes 37 to 41 and accompanying text for discus-
sion about the jury of presentment and the Magna Carta.
59 Law, supra note 25, at 64-65.
60 Id. at 66-67.
61 Henry VIII employed the oath and the inquisition in his efforts to solidify Anglican
supremacy. Id. at 69-76. The Catholic Queen Mary used a strong High Commission and
Star Chamber to solidify Catholic supremacy at the expense of protestants, prosecuting
them as heretics. Id. at 76-77. These courts' use of inquisitorial methods provoked opposi-
tion and helped foster arguments supporting the right to silence. Id. at 77. When Eliza-
beth took power, she simply reversed the roles of protestants and Catholics. Id. at 83-91.
Under Elizabeth, the punishment for treason was "a peculiarly gory one, deliberately in-
tended to be a spectacle of horror." Id. By 1585, approximately 176 Catholic priests and
laymen met this fate. Id. at 87. Through Parliament's Act of Supremacy, the Crown took
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Parliament recognized this authority in the Act of Supremacy, which
gave the Crown power over all ecclesiastical matters, and allowed the
delegation of this power to commissioners. 62
In the last half of the sixteenth century, ecclesiastical matters be-
came matters of state, and religious violations became treasonable.
Not surprisingly, the Crown adopted ecclesiastical methods-the in-
quisition-to enforce religious and political orthodoxy. Conse-
quently, the tools which the Crown used in this effort, the Court of
High Commission and the Court of the Star Chamber, became the
central battleground in the development of the right to silence.
63
While both institutions could impose the oath and force testimony,
the High Commission did not allow the accused to know the charges,
or to be represented or assisted by counsel.
64
By early in the fourteenth century, the Court of the Star Chamber
had developed from its birth as part of the King's Council into ajudi-
cial body. In its early years as a judicial body, its proceedings were
secret and its methods were largely within its own discretion. These
methods included inquisitorial techniques, the use of secret inform-
ers, and even torture. 65 By 1580, however, the Star Chamber had be-
come less fearsome. Its proceedings were open, and its jurisdiction
was generally limited to enforcing royal orders. Although it could still
administer torture, branding, and imprisonment, it did not exact the
most severe penalties, such as dismemberment or death.66 This rela-
tively moderate trend ended late in the sixteenth century as the
Crown began to use the Star Chamber along with the High Commis-
sion as inquisitorial enforcers of religious and political orthodoxy.
all Ecclesiastical powers, including those of the courts. Id. at 95. As Protestantism was re-
established, Catholics became both heretics and traitors. Id. at 66-76, 83-92, 95.
62 The settlement which included the Act of Supremacy dates to 1559. Id. at 85, 95.
63 Id. at 83-85, 100-01, 106, 184-86. As authorized by the Act of Supremacy, the Crown
delegated its power over religious matters to the High Commission which, by 1576, began
to resemble a tribunal. Its procedures were, if anything, more repressive than those of the
Star Chamber. Id. at 125.
64 In attacking the High Commission's procedures, James Morice noted that, by con-
trast, the common law courts and even the Star Chamber in most cases, assured that the
accused 'hath a knowne accusor, and perfect understandynge of the cause or cryme ob-
jected, and therewithall is permitted to have a coppie of the bill of complainte or informa-
tion.., and tyme convenient, and counsell learned well to consider and advise of his oathe
and answere." Id. at 182-83 (quoting JAMEs MoRIcE, A BRiEFE TREATsE OF OATHES Ex-
ACTED By ORDINARIES AND ECCIESIASTICAL JUDGES, TO ANSwERE GENERALLIE TO ALL SUCH
ARTICLES OR INTERROGATORIES, AS PLEASETH THEM TO PROPOUND. AND OF THEIR FORCED
AND CONSTRAINED OATHES Ex OFFICIO, WHEREIN IS PROVED THAT THE SAME ARE UNLAwFuLL
38-39 (1600 ed.)).
65 The court's name came from early references to its meeting room, a chamber with
stars painted on the ceiling. Id- at 49, 51-53.
66 Id. at 100-01, 106.
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B. THE CLASH OF RIVAL SYSTEMS
The inquisitorial methods of the Crown soon came into conflict
with the common law courts. As early as 1568, Lord ChiefJustice Dyer
of the Court of Common Pleas granted a writ of habeas corpus freeing
a prisoner who was being forced to take the oath. In granting the
writ, Dyer was the first to justify objecting to the oath in what became
a famous maxim: "nemo tenetur seipsum prodere," or, no man shall be
forced to produce evidence against himself.67 While Dyer viewed this
maxim as having derived from the canon law, its historical origins and
justification remain vague. This ambiguity about the source of the
maxim was common during the late sixteenth century, as a variety of
reasons were articulated to justify silence when the oath was imposed.
For instance, when Puritan Thomas Cartwright was accused of reli-
gious offenses, he argued that the oath invaded an individual's pri-
vacy, violated that person's conscience, and was against religious
principles.6
8
Soon, common law and the Magna Carta became the primary jus-
tifications for opposition to the oath. Respected lawyer and member
of Parliament James Morice argued that the oath violated common
law by presuming the accused guilty and forcing them to prove that
presumption true.69 To Morice, this violated chapter twenty-nine of
the Magna Carta, which assured that criminal proceedings would be
governed by the law of the land as established by Parliament, and not
by the Crown and its special courts.70 According to opponents of the
oath like Morice, Parliament had barred the use of the oath in 1534,
when it repealed a law dating from 1401 which had given bishops the
power to use inquisitorial techniques.71 In addition, they believed
that the methods of the Crown's inquisitorial courts violated chapter
twenty-eight of the Magna Carta, which required proper presentment
before the oath.72 Some opponents even asserted that chapter twenty-
67 According to Justice Dyer in Leigh's case, in cases involving life or limb, "the lawe
compelled not the partie to sweare, and avouched this place, 'nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere.'" Id. at 96, 105.
68 Id. at 177.
69 Id. at 194-96. Morice also viewed the procedure as a violation of privacy. Id at 196.
In addition, he decried it as unfair, because the methods allowed questioners to confuse
suspects, and then convict them from the confused words taken from the suspects' own
mouths. Id at 66.
70 Id. at 194-95.
71 Id. at 180-81, 195. The Act of 1401, De Haereteco Comburendo, (concerning the heretic
who must be burned) had authorized bishops to use inquisitorial techniques to root out
and burn heretics. Id. at 57-62. In 1534, when Henry VIII himself fought the church,
Parliament succeeded in repealing the law, an enactment which did not stop Henry from
carrying on his own inquisitions which resulted in the deaths of 51 heretics. Id. at 68-69.
72 Id. at 171, 235-36.
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eight barred the oath outright, regardless of proper presentment.73
These arguments against the Crown's use of inquisitorial proce-
dures rested upon the assumption that both the Magna Carta and the
common law limited the Crown's sovereignty and that Parliament, as a
source of the common law, limited the Crown's sovereignty. Not sur-
prisingly, the Grown did not agree with these assumptions and it con-
tinued to impose the oath. By the seventeenth century, the struggle
over the oath and the right to silence became a struggle of Parliament
and the common law courts against the Crown.74 For example, early
in the seventeenth century Parliament made four attempts to recon-
firm chapter twenty-nine of the Magna Carta, hoping to force the
Crown to adhere to the procedures of the common law courts.75
The common law courts were also active during this struggle.
Perhaps the ablest champion of their position was Lord Coke. As
ChiefJustice of the Court of Common Pleas, Lord Coke asserted the
preeminence of the common law courts and set clear limits on the
Crown's ecclesiastical courts. His opportunity came in Fuller's case,
when the judges of the King's Bench sought his advice on how to re-
solve the King's demand to punish Nicholas Fuller, an attorney and
member of the House of Commons. Fuller had aggressively attacked
the High Commission when he sought writs of habeas corpus from the
King's Bench to free his clients from a High Commission prosecution.
In his report on Fuller's case, Coke wrote that the judges had resolved
that, while the ecclesiastical courts were competent in their own
sphere, they enjoyed their jurisdiction only through Parliament's au-
thority, and common law courts could rule on the limits of that juris-
diction. Applying these principles, the court authorized the High
Commission to punish Fuller only for ecclesiastical offenses such as
heresy, and not for any common law offenses.7 6 Coke confirmed
these principles by issuing a series of writs of prohibition, halting pro-
ceedings as contrary to the Magna Carta and the common law. These
rulings asserted Parliament's power to make law, confirmed the indi-
vidual's right to the benefits of common law, and evinced a hostility to
the oath and inquisitorial procedures.
77
73 Id. at 171.
74 Id. at 217-28, 241-46.
75 Id. at 227-28.
76 Id. at 233, 238-40.
77 These cases included writs of prohibition issued by Coke to bar prerogative courts
from interrogating suspects. The writs were based on the justification that these courts
were operating beyond their jurisdiction, that the subjects were entitled to the benefits of
common law, and that Parliament, and not the King makes law. Id. at 244-47, 249. Coke's
opinions, in combination, evince a general hostility to inquisitorial procedures. The case
of Thomas Edwards stands as an example, and was chosen by Coke to appear in his Re-
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Coke's rulings threatened to undermine the Crown's inquisitorial
procedures and ultimately the supreme authority of King James. In
response, King James dismissed Coke from the bench in 1616.78 De-
spite this, the law began to limit the application of the oath and in-
quisitorial interrogation, and the right to silence began to develop.
The Court of Star Chamber could force suspects to take the oath and
subject them to interrogation only in cases of misdemeanors-where
loss of life or limb was not possible-and then, only after they had
been shown the charges against them. 79 Also, the High Commission
barred the oath in criminal cases. While the oath could still be used
against the clergy, ordinary citizens faced the oath only in testamen-
tary and matrimonial cases.80
These rules were gradually extended through the arguments of
those objecting to the use of inquisitorial procedures. 81 In addition,
objections to the oath were no longer based primarily on the inquisi-
tor's failure to provide proper presentment. Opponents of the oath
argued more expansively, that it was wrong to coerce people to testify
against themselves because such procedures violated human dignity
and were contrary to the human instinct of self preservation.
8 2
As opponents of the oath began to articulate this more expansive
ports. Id. at 245-46; Edwards' case, 13 Coke's Rep. 9, at 10 (1609). The use of such writs had
a long history, dating back to the thirteenth century when on the King's behalf writs were
issued to halt ecclesiastical courts from using inquisitorial methods in cases beyond their
jurisdiction. LEVY, supra note 25, at 216-18.
78 The King viewed his power as supreme, including his power to make law. LEVY, supra
note 25, at 242-43. Coke's view, that law stood over the word of the King, was naturally
seen as a challenge to the Crown's supremacy: Id. at 253. After he was dismissed from his
judicial role, Coke continued his fight against the oath as a member of Parliament. Id. at
261.
79 Id. at 257.
80 Id. at 256-57.
81 For instance, during an investigation into fraud and corruption by the House of
Lords in 1620, witnesses and suspects were told that they would not be forced to incrimi-
nate themselves. In 1628 common lawjudges agreed that a suspect in a murder case could
not be coerced into confessing. In a seditious conspiracy case a year later, suspects were
only obliged to answer questions which did not concern themselves. In a 1631 rape prose-
cution, the suspect argued that he should not be examined "of those whereof he must
accuse himself." Id. at 263-64.
82 Id. at 263. These views gained strength through Parliament's Petition of Right, for
which Coke was a notable proponent. The Petition included objections to an oath and
forced interrogation which was imposed by a special commission of the King seeking to
compel individuals to contribute to a loan for the Crown. Id. at 262-63. It was in the
debates on the Petition that Coke urged the supremacy of the law and the Parliament over
the Crown: "I know that prerogative is a part of the law; but 'sovereign power' is no parlia-
mentary word .... Magna Charta is such a fellow, that he will have no sovereign. I wonder
this sovereign was not in Magna Charta, or in the confirmations of it. If we grant this by
implication, we give a sovereign power above all laws." 2 CUTHBERT W. JOHNSON, THE LIFE
OF SIR EDWARD CoKEa 237 (2d ed. 1845); see also LEVY, supra note 25, at 261.
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view, England suffered a severely reactionary inquisition under King
Charles and Archbishop Laud. Under Laud's power, the High Com-
mission came to dominate the Star Chamber, and it reached into local
districts where its influence had never before been felt.83 Charles sub-
jugated the courts and Parliament. Their petitions and writs objecting
to the inquisition almost ceased.8 4 The inquisition increased its prac-
tice of extracting incriminating statements through the vigorous use
of the confession pro confesso. Under this practice, those who refused
to furnish the evidence of their own guilt were treated as if they had
confessed. This rule also applied when those who did answer had
failed, in the opinion of the inquisitors, to do so fully, plainly, and
directly. Supporters argued that these procedures were justified be-
cause the innocent had nothing to hide, and the truth could not hurt
them. Only the guilty would therefore refuse to answer.8 5
The prosecutions of John Lilburne proved to be a turning point
in the conflict between the Crown and the supporters of the common
law. The result was a victory for the right to silence and a devastating
defeat for inquisitorial procedures in England. 6 The Star Chamber
charged Lilburne with importing seditious books into England.
Lilburne denied importing the books, demanded that he be charged
and confronted by his accusers, and refused to take the oath or to
answer any of the inquisitor's "impertinent questions, for fear that
with my answer I may do myself hurt."
8 7
In 1639 the Star Chamber found Lilburne guilty of contempt for
his refusal to take the oath, jailed him until he agreed to do so, and
sentenced him to corporal punishment. At his flogging, Lilburne
preached to a large and sympathetic crowd about the injustice of the
inquisition.88 The political tide was turning against the Crown, how-
ever, as the first shudders of political revolution were felt in England.
83 LEvy, supra note 25, at 266-67, 270-71.
84 Id. at 268.
85 Id. at 269, 270-71.
86 Lilburne actually suffered four prosecutions, and although he won his cases in court,
he was eventually forced into exile and then imprisoned at Dover Castle. In 1657, at age
43, while at home on a parole, he died. Id. at 269, 273-300, 312; PAULINE GREGG, FREE-BORN
JOHN, A BIOGRAPHY OFJOHN LILBURNE 346 (1961).
87 Lilburne and another prisoner were "remanded to the prison of the fleet, there to
remain until they conform themselves in obedience to take their oaths, and to be ex-
amined...." 3 THOMAS B. HowELL, A COMPLETE COLLECrION OF STATE T~aALs AND PRO-
CEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARUEsT
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 1323 (London, Paternoster Row Press 1824); LEvy, supra note 25,
at 273. Lilburne also invoked the Petition of Right, arguing that it barred the imposition
of the oath. Id. at 277. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 423, for a brief
discussion of Lilburne's trials.
88 LEVY, supra note 25, at 277; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 423.
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Soon Parliament and the Puritans gained power, and within two years
of his flogging, Lilburne's arguments against the oath began to gain
the upper hand. In 1641, Parliament ruled Lilburne's sentence ille-
gal, abolished the Star Chamber and the High Commission, and
barred the use of the oath in penal cases.8 9 One year later, the right
to silence was invoked and recognized in an impeachment trial of
twelve Anglican bishops prosecuted before the Puritan-controlled
Long Parliament for petitioning the King to protest their exclusion
from the House of Lords.90 The right to silence was firmly in place by
1688, when King James II prosecuted seven bishops for defying his
edict abolishing all laws against nonconformists. In refusing to admit
to signing a petition protesting the edict, Archbishop Sancroft in-
voked his "lawful right to decline saying anything which may criminate
me."
91
With the elimination of the Crown's inquisitorial mechanisms,
common law courts came to dominate the English criminal justice sys-
tem.9 2 Building on common law traditions, the system moved towards
an accusatorial model. This evolution was slow, and notable excep-
tions continued for hundreds of years. For example, the law did not
guarantee that accused persons would be given a copy of the indict-
ment and the opportunity to use counsel in their defense until 1696,
and accused persons did not have the right to compulsory process in
felony cases so they could call witnesses and have them testify under
oath until 1701. 9 3 Indeed, until the late nineteenth century, the ac-
cused did not have the right to testify in their own defense in either
England or the United States.94 In England, until 1848,justices of the
peace were permitted to closely question the accused at a preliminary
examination.95 Until 1965 in the United States, some states allowed
89 LEVY, supra note 25, at 280-82.
90 Id. at 284-85.
91 2 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY (Lady Trevelyan ed., 1866), excerpted in LAw AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15 (Stephen B. Presser & Jamil S. Zainaldin eds.,
1989). At a preliminary proceeding, the bishops were asked to admit to signing a petition
against the King's edict. In response, the bishops invoked their right to remain silent until
personally ordered by the King to answer. He did and they replied affirmatively, but only
based on the understanding that their answers would not be used against them-an im-
plied immunity from prosecution. The jury's "not guilty" verdict in the case was deemed
an affirmation of Parliament's power to make law.
92 LEVY, supra note 25, at 280-320.
93 Id. at 321-23.
94 Congress passed the law allowing the accused the right to testify in federal trials in
1878. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65 (1893) (quoting the Act of Congress of
March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat 30). In Britain, the accused was disqualified from interest
from giving testimony under oath until 1899. LEVY, supra note 25, at 324.
95 In England, pretrial examination of the accused by justices of the peace had been
permitted since 1554 and continued until 1848. LEvy, supra note 25, at 325, 375; see also
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prosecutors and judges to urge jurors to draw adverse inferences from
an accused's silence-even though Congress had barred the practice
in the federal courts in 1878. Until the 1994 revisions, judges in Eng-
land could still do this to a very limited extent.96 Over time, however,
these exceptions continued to dwindle, and the accusatorial model
took hold in both England and the United States.
III. THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM.
The criminal justice system that has developed in England and
the United States is an accusatorial system which imposes on the gov-
ernment the burden of proving a case through witnesses and extrinsic
evidence, and which cloaks the accused in a presumption of inno-
cence. The accusatorial system produces a wide range of benefits: it
assures limited government, limits the abuse of suspects, and protects
individual privacy, dignity, and free choice. It also renders accurate
verdicts. In large measure, the vitality of this system and the benefits
which it produces rest on its protection of suspects' right to remain
silent.
The accusatorial system uses contested trials to resolve disputes
between parties. Counsel represents each side and is responsible for
framing the legal issues and presenting witnesses and evidence.
97
Then a neutral decision-maker resolves the case based upon the evi-
dence presented by the parties. 98 The government's burden is two-
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 424 ("The practice of pre-trial examination
(and the use of the results at trial) remained unmodified until 1848.").
96 When Congress passed the law allowing the accused the right to testify in federal
trials, it also provided that the accused's failure to testify "shall not create any presumption
against him." Wilson, 149 U.S. at 65 (quoting the Act of Congress of March 16, 1878, ch.
37, 20 Stat. 30). In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court ruled
that the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt." Id. at 615. While English judges have to a
limited extent been permitted to offer comment on the accused's failure to testify, the
proper extent of this practice has been unclear. Jackson, supra note 8, at 106-07. Some
commentary indicates that such judicial comment has been "made much more sparingly"
or "almost apologetically." Greer, supra note 18, at 715 (quoting CIuMINAL LAW REVISION
COMM., supra note 9).
97 Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on the Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STA. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1974); LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 19,
§ 1.6, at 37.
98 In an accusatorial system, the trier of fact relies upon the evidence presented by the
parties in court. In an inquisitorial system, judges, as triers of fact, rely on the dossier, a
written compilation of the evidence prepared before trial, often by the judges themselves.
Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continen-
tal Europe 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 267-69 (1991) (discussing the dossier in the
Italian system); see also Goldstein, supra note 97, at 1018-19 (discussing the French system).
The adversary system relies on the parties, driven by their own self-interest, to gather and
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fold: first, it bears the burden of going forward, which includes
bringing the charge and presenting the case; second, it carries the
burden of persuasion, which entails convincing the neutral decision-
maker of the accused's guilt.99 The government is able to bear the
burden of proof better than a suspect. It has a superior ability to col-
lect and preserve evidence and to assure that the trier of fact is aware
of all relevant evidence. Imposing the burden of proof on the govern-
ment also balances the government's superior resources over the
individual. 100
Because the accused are presumed innocent and carry no bur-
den, they may remain silent. If the prosecution fails to carry its bur-
den and establish a prima facie case against the accused, the accused
may be acquitted without producing evidence.'01 The suspect's right
to silence assures that government alone carries its burden 0 2 "'by evi-
dence independently and freely secured,' without compelling the ac-
cused to assist in this prosecution responsibility." 0 3 It prevents the
present more information and to critique the other side better than an investigating magis-
trate. By assuring the neutrality of the decision-maker, the adversary system also avoids the
natural tendency present in the inquisitorial system of having the judge, who has compiled
the evidence against the accused, favor the side of the prosecution. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra
note 19, § 1.6, at 40; JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADriION 128-32 (2d ed. 1985)
(outlining a view favorably disposed towards the methods of the modern inquisitorial
systems).
99 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 1.6, at 43-44; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)
("Governments are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence indepen-
dently and freely secured.").
100 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 1.6, at 43.
101 Id. § 1.6, at 42; WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2251, at 317. See generally Murphy v. Water-
front Comm., 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (reviewing the history and policies behind the Fifth
Amendment).
102 Some argue that an adversary but non-accusatorial system could operate without the
right to remain silent, because while suspects could be forced to help the government carry
the burden by being forced to answer questions, they would still be represented by counsel
and pitted against their opponent, the state, in a contested trial. See generally Goldstein,
supra note 97, at 1016-17. However, without the right to silence, the accusatorial system
could not function because it is based upon the requirement that the state furnish the
evidence of the accused's guilt, a principle inconsistent with the requirement that suspects
have the duty to furnish the evidence of their guilt. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 1.6,
at 42. In a prosecution the government must "shoulder the entire load alone." Murphy,
378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2251, at 317 (McNaughton Rev.
1961)).
103 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 19, at 43 (quoting Tehan v. United States ex reL Schott,
382 U.S. 406 (1966)). While this represents a statement of the accusatorial principle of
American justice, it is not absolute. In theory, the American system might grant the ac-
cused opportunities to establish their guilt or encourage them to do so, but it does not
compel them to assist in establishing their guilt. Tehan, 382 U.S. at 414-16 (holding that
the accused cannot be compelled to assist in establishing his guilt but can be encouraged
to do so). Some argue that in practice the American system does in fact do the same thing
by employing inquisitorial techniques. See Goldstein, supra note 97.
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government from shifting the burden to the suspect by requiring sus-
pects to speak and, in effect, to testify against themselves.
An accusatorial system and the right to silence limit government's
power over the individual. Such limits are consistent with an essential
component of the American constitutional structure: government has
only limited, enumerated powers granted by the sovereign people. 04
According to Professor LaFave, the right to silence evinces Americans'
inherent distrust of authority.105 Because the accusatorial system fa-
vors proof by extrinsic evidence and witnesses, rather than reliance on
proof by interrogation and confession, it helps to protect people's dig-
nity by assuring that they remain free from humiliation and abuse at
the hands of government investigators. 106 In contrast, an inquisitorial
system creates an inherent hazard of abuse because of its reliance on
interrogation and confessions. Governments too often have used in-
humane and unreliable methods to obtain confessions. For example,
at one time English common law permitted torture to obtain a confes-
sion. 07 In fact, the use of torture to obtain confessions persisted in
treason cases even after it had been banned in general criminal
cases.' 08 Today, in both England and America, abusing suspects to
obtain confessions has resulted in scandal and miscarriage of
justice. 0 9
104 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-09 (1819) (holding that,
although the federal government only possesses limited, enumerated powers, it also pos-
sesses the means to execute its limited powers). Federalist constitutional theory held that
the people possessed sovereignty, and delegated limited, enumerated powers to the federal
government. ALFRED H. KELLY Er AL., THE AMERICAN CONsTrrrION: ITS ORIGINS AND DE-
vELOPMENT 113 (6th ed. 1983).
105 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 19, § 1.6, at 43.
106 Id. at 49.
107 OrIS H. STEPHENS, SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 18-19 (1973) (After
the twelfth century, with the growing influence of the Roman Law, the use of torture to
obtain confessions gained widespread acceptance. This practice continued until the seven-
teenth century in England's common law courts, although in England the practice was
never as widespread as in France or Spain.). E. M. Morgan, The Privilege Against SefIncrimi-
nation, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1949) (noting that one indication of the acceptance of the
use of torture is that in 1597, Lord Coke, considered a champion of the right to silence,
.personally conducted an examination by torture").
108 During the mid 1700s, English courts began to set limits on the state's methods of
gaining confessions. LE, supra note 25, at 328-29. See also STEPHENS, supra note 107, at 18-
21 (briefly reviewing the move towards eliminating torture in England during the seven-
teenth century).
109 REPORT, supra note 5, at 1 (the report was in part a response to miscarriages of Eng-
lish justice in which police abuses lead to unreliable confessions); Steven Greer, Miscar-
riages ofJustice Reconsidered, 57 MOD. L. REv. 58, 68-71 (1994); STEPHENs, supra note 107, at
37-38, 43, 49 (discussing the use of torture to obtain convictions, including cases in the
southern United States during the 1920s). See also People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987)




An accusatorial system protects people's privacy by limiting the
government's power to pry into their thoughts and conscience; it of-
fers "respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a pri-
vate life . . ,"'110 The accusatorial system also affords people free
choice over their fate because when suspected of a crime, they may
chose whether or not to provide the government with evidence to aid
in securing their own convictions.111
The accusatorial system is also favored because of its effectiveness
in producing accurate verdicts through its reliance on the adversary
process and extrinsic evidence. In an adversary process, each side
marshals arguments and evidence in its favor, while rebutting the
other side's arguments and critiquing the other side's evidence. By
relying on extrinsic evidence, the accusatorial system takes advantage
of the testimony of independent witnesses, professional investigators,
and expert witnesses capable of producing scientific evidence, such as
fingerprint comparisons, DNA tests, blood and fiber analysis, and
other forensic techniques.' 12 By contrast, the inquisitorial system's re-
liance on interrogation can yield false confessions, and consequently,
inaccurate verdicts. This is because under interrogation, weak sus-
pects may falsely confess to crimes they never committed. Even strong
suspects may falsely confess under interrogation. As early as the nine-
teenth century, courts recognized that extreme interrogation tech-
niques-such as promises of freedom or benefit, torture, and
threats-could render a confession unreliable. 113 Justice Goldberg
summed up the hazards of a suspect relying on confessions in Escobedo
v. Illinois when he stated that a system "which comes to depend on the
110 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Schott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1965) (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956) (FrankJ. dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957)).
111 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
112 See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see generally LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note
19, § 1.6 at 40.
113 Regina v. Garner, 169 Eng. Rep. 267, 267-68 (Q.B. 1848) (suppressing the confession
of a thirteen-year-old girl charged with attempting to murder her mistress by poison as the
product of an inducement because she was told it would be better for her to speak the
truth). Even earlier, the common law began to recognize that some confessions could be
unreliable, which could cause the conviction of innocent persons. In 1783 the English
case King v. Warickshall established the rule that an unreliable confession could be ex-
cluded from evidence. 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783) (distinguishing between reliable
confessions, the court stated: "A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest
credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is
admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from the mind by
the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to
be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore
it is rejected.") (citations omitted).
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'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence indepen-
dently secured through skillful investigation."
14
The "essential mainstay" of this accusatorial system is the right to
silence. 115 Without it, the government could shift the burden of proof
to the accused by requiring the accused to present evidence in re-
sponse to questioning during interrogation and by requiring the ac-
cused to present a case in court by testifying during trial. If a
government succeeds in curtailing this right and allows adverse infer-
ences to be drawn, the presumption of innocence would also be im-
periled. In effect, a mere accusation would create a presumption of
guilt. If suspects failed to rebut this during interrogation and trial, a
judge or jury could infer that they are guilty. Such a system would not
rely on the government to prove guilt by extrinsic means, but on the
accused to furnish the evidence of their own guilt, a shift that would
encourage the reliance on confessions that Justice Goldberg decried.
IV. LIMITING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
A. THE CONTEXT
Home Secretary Michael Howard announced the British govern-
ment's decision 1 6 to limit the right to silence at the Conservative
Party conference in October 1993, as part of a package of criminal
justice reforms aimed at "getting tough" on crime." 7 By making this
proposal, the Government revived a debate about curtailing the right
to silence that dates to the early 1970s.118 The seminal report fueling
this debate was a 1972 report by the Criminal Law Revision Commit-
tee (CLRC), which suggested that adverse inferences should be drawn
against accused persons who failed to mention during interrogation a
fact later relied upon in their defense." 9 The report also recom-
mended that adverse inferences should be drawn if the accused failed
to testify at trial.120
114 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
115 Tehan v. United States ex reL Schott, 882 U.S. 406, 414 (1966) (quoting Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)).
116 Public Order Act, supra note 2, §§ 34-37.
117 Mills, supra note 2, at 6; Howard's Beginning, supra note 2, at 17.
118 Greer, supra note 8, at 715-18 (discussing the chronology of the controversy during
the seventies and eighties).
119 CRimrNAL LA&W REVSION COMM., supra note 9, 1 32 and Appendix, cl. 1 of the Draft
Criminal Evidence Bill, cited in LENG, supra note 5, at 2, n.5. In general, adverse inferences
are discussed in the CRIMINAL LAW RESION COMM., supra note 9, 1 28-45.
120 The report also recommended that adverse inferences should be drawn if, after a
prime facie case had been established, the accused person failed to testify at trial. CRIMINAL
LAW REVISION COMM., supra note 9, 1 108-13 and Appendix, cl. 5 of the Draft Criminal
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In 1976, the Republic of Singapore became the first government
to adopt the recommendations of the CLRC.' 21 Singapore curtailed
the right to silence, hoping to induce suspects to cooperate with the
police in solving crimes, and to reduce the number of cases in which
the police believed criminals went free because they kept silent.'
22
Until 1976, persons charged and tried for criminal offenses in Singa-
pore enjoyed a right to silence resembling that found in England.'
23
The new rules were embodied in an amendment to the Singapore
Criminal Procedure Code (amendment).124 Under the amendment,
if suspects do not reveal to the police during questioning a fact which
they could "reasonably have been expected to mention," the court
may draw "such inferences from the failure as appear proper.' 25 Also
under the amendment, the accused face adverse inferences if they re-
fuse to testify. Courts inform the accused, after the prosecution has
rested its case, that if they should, "without good cause, refuse to an-
swer any question, the court in determining whether [they are] guilty
... may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear proper."'
2 6
The CLRC's suggestions met with more resistance in England. In
1981, a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure rejected the
CLRC's proposals. The commission concluded that adverse infer-
ences would shift the burden of proof to the accused and pressure
innocent persons into false confessions.' 27 In 1987, however, Home
Secretary Douglas Hurd revived the debate when he argued in his Po-
Evidence Bill, in LENG, supra note 5, at 2 n.8.
121 Criminal Law and Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 10 (effectiveJan. 1, 1977)
(1976) (Sing.); CRIMINAL Law REVISION COMM., supra note 9; Yeo, supra note 13.
122 Yeo, supra note 13, at 90 ("The rationale for this amendment was that the law should
afford greater assistance to the police and the prosecution in their fight against crime.").
123 Id. at 89. Before the amendments, the Singapore police cautioned arrestees that
they were not obliged to make a statement or answer questions. After the amendments,
suspects were told that the court could draw an adverse inference from their silence, if they
had failed to mention a fact which they would have been expected to mention when inter-
rogated. Before Singapore curtailed the right to silence, its judges could, as in England,
draw some adverse inferences from silence. Haw Tua Tau v. P.P., 3 All E.R 14, 20 (1981);
Yeo, supra note 13, at 99 n.44. As in England, the extent of this power, and the circum-
stances under which its use was appropriate, were unclear. Yeo, supra note 13, at 99 n.42-
43; Greer, supra note 18, at 712.
124 Criminal Law and Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, supra note 121. The amend-
ment also eliminated an unusual option which had been afforded the accused in Singa-
pore trials. Formerly, they could offer unsworn testimony and avoid cross-examination.
Yeo, supra note 13, at 97-98.
125 The new caution provides: "If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your
defense.., mention it now. If you hold back... your evidence may be less likely to be
believed...." Section 121(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, cited inYeo, supra note 13,
at 91.
126 Haw Tua Tau, 3 All E.R. at 18-19, cited in Yeo, supra note 13, at 97-98.




lice Foundation lecture that the right to silence did not protect the
innocent, whose interests were best served by answering police ques-
tions.128 According to many commentators, Hurd's proposals were in
response to police pressures to make interrogation easier. 129 In large
measure, these pressures grew in reaction to the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act of,1984 (PACE), which constrained the police during
interrogations and implicitly criticized police investigatory tech-
niques.' 30 PACE reformed investigatory procedures by mandating,
among other things, that the police tape record interrogations and
allow duty solicitors to advise suspects during interrogation.'
31
In 1988, nearly two years after Hurd's remarks, the British govern-
ment responded to a series of terrorist attacks by limiting the right to
silence of suspects arrested in Northern Ireland. 32 According to the
Government, this move was necessary because the right to silence was
seriously hindering their ability to convict terrorists. 3 3 The change,
however, applied not only to terrorist suspects, but to suspects ar-
rested for all offenses in Northern Ireland. 34 The new limits on the
right to silence were part of the Criminal Evidence Order (Order).
The Order adopted the suggestions of the CLRC and added two situa-
tions in which adverse inferences could be drawn from the accuseds'
silence: if suspects failed to account for the presence of suspicious
objects on their person or clothing or in the place where the suspect
was found; and if suspects failed to account for their presence near
the scene of a crime.'3 5 As in Singapore, the order required judges to
admonish the accused, in the jury's presence, that adverse inferences
could be drawn if they refused to testify.'
3 6
128 Greer, supra note 18, at 716; Zander, supra note 2, at 25.
129 Dixon, supra note 13, at 29 n.8 and accompanying text ("It was claimed to be neces-
sary because of the effects on police interrogation of PACE . ."); Greer, supra note 18, at
720.
130 Dixon, supra note 13, at 29; Greer, supra note 18, at 720.
131 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, Vol. 11 (1) HA.LSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND (4th
ed. 1990) "Interview records" at 553-54; "Interviews in the police station, records and writ-
ten statements" at 555-56; "Interviews to be tape recorded" at 560-61; "Right to legal ad-
vice" at 542-45.
132 The timing of the move also helps explain its speedy passage. It was submitted dur-
ing the widely publicized trial of three persons accused of conspiring to kill the Prime
Minister, all of whom invoked their right to silence. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 31 n.19
and accompanying text. The Government made this move by Order in Council, a legisla-
tive device which allowed the measures to pass with great speed and little debate. Id.;
Jackson, supra note 10, at 404-05.
133 Jackson, supra note 8; see also Jackson, supra note 10, at 404 (which cites the com-
ments of Mr. King during the debate in the House of Commons. 140 H.C. Debs, cols. 183-
87, Nov. 8, 1988).
134 Jackson, supra note 10, at 405.
135 Order, supra note 10.
136 Jackson, supra note 10, at 405.
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Also in 1988, Mr. Hurd indicated his intention to apply these lim-
its on the right to silence in England and Wales. To achieve this goal,
he assigned the task of crafting the plan to a Home Office Working
Group. The Group's report, released in July of 1989, strongly sup-
ported the use of adverse inferences.137 Soon after the report's re-
lease, the momentum for limiting the right to silence in England was
halted by revelations of police misconduct during interrogations and
investigations, and resulting miscarriages ofjustice. a3 These cases in-
cluded the wrongful convictions of the Guildford Four, the subject of
a popular 1994 film, In the Name of the Father,3 9 and the Birmingham
Six, who were -convicted in a 1974 bombing and spent over sixteen
years in prison before the Court of Appeals quashed their convictions.
Such cases prompted the government, in 1991, to form a Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Justice to ensure that the guilty were convicted
and the innocent set free.
140
In 1993, just months before Home Secretary Michael Howard an-
nounced the Government's plan to abolish the right to silence, the
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice released two publications sug-
gesting that the right should be retained. The Right to Silence in Police
Interrogation: A Study of Some of the Issues Underlying the Debate (Study)
surveyed the use of the right and concluded that adverse inferences
would not increase confessions or convictions.' 41 In the Study, the
Commission concluded that eliminating the right to silence would re-
duce the prosecution's burden of proof, raise the risk that innocent
persons would be convicted, and encourage the police to rely more
on interrogation, a sometimes unreliable method as shown by the re-
cent miscarriages of justice. 142 Coming on the heels of the Commis-
sion's reports, Howard's announcement of Prime Minister Major's
intention to limit the right to silence' 43 drew the vocal reaction of
critics, who charged that Major's proposal was an attempt to sacrifice
137 Greer, supra note 18, at 717 n.54.
138 Id. at 718. The miscarriage of justice also raised questions about whether suspects'
rights would be protected if the right to silence was limited. REPORT, supra note 5; see also
Dixon, supra note 13, at 31 n.18 and accompanying text.
139 Janet Maslin, In the Name of the Father; The Sins of a Son are Vsited on his Father, N.Y.
TMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at Cll. (A film starring Daniel Day Lewis and Emma Thompson,
directed by Jim Sheridan).
140 REPORT, sura note 5, at 1.
141 LENG, supra note 5, at 79-80.
142 REPORT, supra note 5, at 1 (the report was in part a response to miscarriages of Eng-
lish justice in which police abuses lead to unreliable confessions); see also Greer, supra note
109, at 68-71.
143 Anthony Scrivener, Tough Justice on the Cheap, THE INDEPENDENT, October 7, 1993, at
27.
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ancient principles in order to pander to public fears about crime,
1 "
save money,145 and pacify the nation's police.146 This last charge was
made because, at the time of Howard's announcement, the police
were strongly objecting to the Home Office's proposed personnel and
fiscal reforms.147 In addition, the police had continued to press for
the abolition of the right in reaction to the PACE reforms of the
1980s.' 48
B. THE LAW
Major's new law adopts the limits placed on the right to silence in
Northern Ireland.149 It contains four sections describing situations
which trigger the use of adverse inferences from silence. The first
section follows a CLRC recommendation that was adopted in Singa-
pore and in Northern Ireland. It allows such adverse inferences "as
appear proper" to be drawn when the accused does not tell the police,
during interrogation after being cautioned or informed of the law,
any fact relied upon in their defense at trial if, under the circum-
stances, they would have been "reasonably expected" to mention that
fact.' 50 This section, which corresponds to Article 3 of the Northern
Ireland Order, was, according to the Government, designed to end
terrorists' use of the "ambush defense," in which terrorist suspects
would remain silent during interrogation, not reveal any details of
their defense until trial, and thus prevent the police and prosecution
from preparing a rebuttal to the defense claims.' 51
The second section adopts the CLRC recommendation allowing
144 Id.; Zander, supra note 2, at 25; The Right to Silence, supra note 6, at 17; Nature, Oct. 14,
1993, at 591, 592 ("after a string of convictions acknowledged to be unjust and based on
false confessions submitted as evidence by the police, can the innocent be sure that what
they say will not harm them? Worse, the Runciman Commission [The Royal Commission]
concluded that the present law is necessary if public respect for criminal justice is to be
preserved.").
145 Scrivener, supra note 143, at 27.
146 Zander, supra note 2, at 25.
147 Proposals for reform unpopular with the police have included cutting the ranks of
middle management. This proposal could result in the loss of 5000 police jobs over five
years, thus, ending what is essentially a tenured position, replacing it with ten-year con-
tracts and instituting performance evaluations so that promotions would be based on merit
and not seniority. The Police, Paying the Bill, THE ECONOMIST, July 23, 1993, at 53. The
Conservative Government's trouble with rapidly increased spending on police has caused
them to give closer scrutiny to costs. Clarke Loiters with Inten THE ECONOMiST, January 23,
1993, at 57.
148 Zander, supra note 2, at 25; Greer, supra note 18, at 716.
149 Public Order Act, supra note 2, §§ 34-37. Compare Order, supra note 10.
150 Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 34; see supra notes 117 and 125 to 126.
151 Jackson, supra note 10, at 405; THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINALJUSTICE, THE RIGHT
TO SILENCE IN PoucE INTERROGATION: A STUDY OF SOME OF THE IssuEs UNDERLYING THE
DEBATE 45 (1993).
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such adverse inferences "as appear proper" to be drawn from the ac-
cused's failure to testify at trial'152 Proponents argue that silence at
trial often allows a guilty party to avoid conviction, and that allowing
adverse inferences will remedy this problem by inducing testimony by
the accused, thus allowing their stories to be tested by cross examina-
tion.153 This section is virtually identical to the rule adopted in Singa-
pore and Northern Ireland, except that an amendment in the House
of Commons eliminated the requirement that the judge admonish the
accused in the jury's presence that adverse inferences might be drawn
if they refuse to testify. This was dropped because of opposition from
judges.15
4
The second section also alters a long-established rule of English
law. Since the end of the nineteenth century, English common law
has guaranteed the accused the right to remain silent at trial. Before
that time the accused could not be coerced to testify because they
were not permitted to testify at all. The accused's testimony was con-
sidered unreliable because it came from an interested party. When
Parliament granted the accused the right to testify in 1898, it decided
that the accused should not be pressured to do so, and thus prohib-
ited the prosecution from commenting on the accused's failure to tes-
tify.' 5 5  In limited circumstances, English judges-unlike their
American counterparts-have been permitted to offer limited com-
152 Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 35.
Where this subsection applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for
the prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment, in the pres-
ence of the jury) that the accused is aware that the stage has been reached at which
evidence can be given for the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence and
that, if he chooses not to give evidence, or having been sworn, without good cause
refuses to answer any question, it will be permissible for the court or jury to draw such
inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence or his refusal, without
good cause, to answer any question.
Id. The CLRC report recommended that adverse inferences should be drawn if, after a
primefacie case had been established, the accused person failed to testify at trial. CRIMINAL
LAw REvisION COMM., supra note 9, 108-113 and Appendix, cl. 5 of the Draft Criminal
Evidence Bill.
153 LENG, supra note 5, at 4-5, 38. Proponents have argued that silence at trial deprives
juries of the opportunity to hear the accused's story tested by cross examination.
154 After the amendment, this section reads: "the court shall ... satisfy itself" that the
accused understand that they may testify, and the consequences of refusing to do so. Pub-
lic Order Act, supra note 2; Howard's Hash, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, § 4, at 5
(editorial expressing disfavor with the Home Secretary for allowing this amendment). For
a discussion of this rule in Singapore, see Haw Tua Tau v. P.P., 3 All E.R. 14, 18-19 (1981),
cited inYeo, supra note 13, at 97-98. In Northern Ireland this rule is codified in section 1 (b)
of the Criminal Evidence Act (1988) (N.I.).
155 Until 1898, the accused were disqualified for interest and incompetent to testify on
their own behalf in English courts. It was thought that the accused's personal stake in the
trial's outcome was too great a temptation to perjury, and that the accused's testimony
would therefore be unreliable. LEvY, supra note 25, at 324.
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ment on the accused's failure to testify after the prosecution has estab-
lished a prima facie case. The extent to which courts may comment
or draw inferences has been unclear, 156 and excessive or unjustified
comment has been the subject of appeals. 57 Some commentary indi-
cates that such judicial comment has been "made much more spar-
ingly" or "almost apologetically." 58
While the extent of permissible judicial comment has been vague
and unclear at common law, judges have not been permitted to invite
the jury to conclude that refusal is itself an indication of guilt.'5 9 At
common law, judges have been permitted to instruct the jury that,
where the accused does not testify, "it means that there is no evidence
from the defendant to undermine, contradict, or explain the evidence
put before you by the prosecution. [However, you still have to decide
whether, on the prosecution's evidence, you are sure of the defend-
ant's guilt]. ' 160 Under the new rule, the evidence may, in the words
of a recent opinion from the House of Lords, "call for an explana-
tion."161 If the accused fails to provide an explanation by testifying,
then judges and prosecutors may invite the jury to make any inference
which to them appears proper-including the "common sense" infer-
ence that there is no explanation for the evidence produced against
the accused and that the accused is guilty.162
156 Jackson, supra note 8, at 106-07 (After the N.I. Order, "the courts could no longer
maintain the ambiguous common law position which was unclear about what inferences
were proper and what were not"); Greer, supra note 18, at 712.
157 Greer, supra note 18, at 714.
158 Greer, supra note 18, at 715 (quoting 1972 CLRC, 109). Jackson reviewed the
changes made by use of adverse inferences, and commented on the Court of Appeal opin-
ion in Murray v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1 W.L.R. 1 H.L. (N.I.) (1994), which
noted that "before the enactment of the Orderjudges in Northern Ireland considered that
the law prevented them from drawing adverse inferences against the accused because he
had failed to give evidence in his own defense." Jackson, supra note 8, at 106.
159 Greer, supra note 18, at 714; Jackson, supra note 8, at 106.
160 The Royal Commission's Report suggested that the following instruction be given by
judges in cases where the accused does not testify:
The defendant does not have to give evidence. He is entitled to sit in the dock and
require the prosecution to prove its case. You must not assume that he is guilty be-
cause he has not given evidence. The fact that he has not given evidence proves noth-
ing, one way or the other. It does nothing to establish his guilt. On the other hand, it
means that there is no evidence from the defendant to undermine, contradict, or
explain the evidence put before you by the prosecution. [However, you still have to
decide whether, on the prosecution's evidence, you are sure of the defendant's guilt.
REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
161 In Murray, 1 W.L.R. at 1, the House of Lords ruled that the Northern Ireland Order
altered the common law rule: "[I]f aspects of the evidence taken alone or in combination
with other facts clearly call for an explanation which the accused ought to be in a position
to give, if an explanation exists, then a failure to give any explanation may as a matter of
common sense allow the drawing of an inference that there is no explanation and that the




The third section allows such adverse inferences "as appear
proper" to be drawn from the accused's failure to respond to police
questions when arrested. This section applies when the accused is ar-
rested in possession of any suspicious objects or substances, or when
suspicious marks are found on the accused's person or clothing or in
the place where the accused was arrested. Under this section, the ac-
cused must respond to questions if the police reasonably believe the
presence of the object was attributable to the accused's participation
in the offense.1 6
3
The fourth section resembles the third. It allows such adverse
inferences "as appear proper" to be drawn from suspects' failure to
explain to the police why they were present at a place at or about the
time of the offense for which they were arrested. As with the third
section, suspects must respond if the police reasonably believe that
the suspect's presence was attributable to their participation in an
offense.164
V. EVALUATING THE CLAIMS OF THE PROPONENTS
In 1981, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recom-
mended that the assumptions behind proposals to limit the right to
silence be carefully examined.1 65 Both before and after that recom-
mendation, a number of studies examined these assumptions, 166 in-
cluding most recently, the Royal Commission's Study, released in
1993.167 In addition, M.H. Yeo studied Singapore's experience five
years after that nation had limited the right to remain silent.168 These
studies have examined, among other things, whether suspects fre-
quently use the right to avoid interrogation; whether adverse infer-
ences cut down the use of the right; whether use of the right causes
the police to drop cases, or increases acquittals or the use of the am-
bush defense; and whether the right is frequently used in court, with
the result that criminals go free.1 69 These studies indicate that al-
163 Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 36. This section corresponds to Article 5 of the
Northern Ireland Order. Jackson, supra note 10, at 405.
164 Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 37. This section corresponds to Article 6 of the
Order. Jackson, supra note 10, at 405.
165 THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Cmnd. 8092,1 1.35, at 11-12 (an. 1981); Dixon, supra note 13, at 28.
166 Barry Mitchell, Confessions and Police Interrogation of Suspects, 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 596.
These surveys are summarized in the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice's publication,
The Right to Silence in Police Interrogation: A Study of Some of the Issues Underlying the Debate.
LENG, supra note 5, at 10-14.
167 LENG, supra note 5.
168 Yeo, supra note 13, at 91-92.
169 Zander, supra note 2, at 25; Greer, supra note 18, at 716; Yeo, supra note 13, at 89;
REPORT, supra note 5; LENa, supra note 5; Mitchell, supra note 166, at 596-600.
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lowing adverse inferences does not induce more confessions by sus-
pects or more testimony by the accused, and does not increase the
number of convictions or reduce crime. 170
A. DO SUSPECTS FREQUENTLY USE THE RIGHT TO AVOID RESPONDING
TO INTERROGATION?
Proponents of limiting the right to remain silent assert that its use
hinders police investigations. Curtailing the right, they reason, would
"dissuade offenders from thwarting prosecution simply by saying noth-
ing."171 In support of this assertion, proponents have cited internal
police research undertaken for the Home Office. For instance, a 1987
study reviewed the records of 1558 interviews by the London Metro-
politan Police. The means of selecting this sample were not stated,
and the study included multiple interviews of the same suspects. In
6% of the interviews, suspects refused to answer any questions; while
in another 6%, suspects refused to answer any questions relevant to
the offense. In an additional 11% of the interviews, suspects refused
to answer some questions. The authors of the study concluded that
23% of interviewees used their right in some manner.
172
A similar study, undertaken for the Home Office in 1988, re-
viewed the records of 3095 interviews conducted by the West York-
shire Police. The report, like the 1987 study, did not indicate how the
sample was chosen. This study reported that in 2.3% of the interviews,
suspects refused to answer any questions; in 2.8% of the interviews,
suspects refused to answer any questions relevant to the offense; and
in 7.3% of the interviews, suspects failed to answer some questions
considered relevant to the offense. The authors concluded that
12.3% of the interviewees invoked their right to remain silent in some
manner.173
While proponents of limiting the right to remain silent argued
that the results of these reports bolstered their position, the studies
were gravely flawed and contrary to the results of independent aca-
demic research. The flaws in the Home Office studies were funda-
mental. As the Royal Commission's Study pointed out, the Home
Office studies examined individual interviews rather than all inter-
views of a particular individual under questioning. Thus, the same
person's repeated refusals to answer questions during numerous inter-
170 LENG, supra note 5, at 79-80.
171 Howard's Beginning, supra note 2.
172 LENG, supra note 5, at 12 (citing HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (1989)).




views counted as numerous instances of the use of the right to remain
silent.174 In fact, the officer in charge of the Metropolitan Police sur-
vey, Detective Superintendent Tom Williamson, later acknowledged
that this flaw lead to an overestimation of the use of the right. Accord-
ing to Williamson, "if a fairly reticent suspect was interviewed five
times, each time withholding some element of a story, then this would
have been recorded as five instances of silence." 175 The Royal Com-
mission's Study pointed out that the Home Office's research should
have assessed how many suspects remained silent throughout the pro-
cess, not how many were silent at some time during the process, but
who may have talked later. The Study also noted that the police col-
lected data for the Home Office's studies at a time when they were
campaigning to abolish the right to remain silent based on the argu-
ment that it was overused.
176
Some of the same problems were present in a subsequent study in
which Williamson participated. In 1992, Moston, Stephenson, and
Williamson reviewed 1067 cases, and found that 174 suspects, or 16%,
used silence in some manner. One-half of these suspects refused to
answer any questions; the other one-half refused to answer some ques-
tions. The study, however, did not include any figures on how many
suspects remained silent throughout the interrogation. Also, it used a
very broad definition of the use of silence, including any refusal to
answer questions, and any evasions by the suspect. 177 In fact, in 33 of
the 174 instances where police characterized suspects as having used
silence, the suspects had actually made some admissions or a confes-
sion, and 50 of the 174 denied allegations. By counting evasions as
the use of silence, the study injected a highly subjective element into
the data. It allowed interviewers to characterize as silence any answers
which they did not believe. This was especially troubling because, as
in the Home Office studies, data were collected by interested par-
ties-police officers.
178
The weight of the evidence suggests that few suspects use the
right to silence to avoid answering questions, that most suspects coop-
174 LENG, supra note 5, at 13.
175 S. Moston et al., The Incidence, Antecedents and Consequences of the Use of the Right to
Silence During Police Questioning, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL HEALTH (forthcoming)
discussed in Dixon, supra note 13, at 4041 (the author acknowledged the study's flawed
methodology and pointed to poorly designed questionnaires as the main source of the
flaws).
176 LENG, supra note 5, at 13. Further, the studies did not describe how their samples
were selected. Id. at 12.
177 Id. at 10, 13-14, discussing S. Moston, et al., supra note 175; see also Dixon, supra note
13, at 40-41.
178 LENG, supra note 5, at 10, 13-14.
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erate with the police during questioning, and that the majority of sus-
pects actually confess. 179 This was demonstrated in the Study, which
both surveyed other studies and presented its own findings.180
Among the studies surveyed was Barry Mitchell's, which examined a
random sample of 400 cases from Worcester Crown Court in 1978.
Mitchell found that only 4.3% of the suspects who were formally ques-
tioned exercised their right to silence at any stage of the proceed-
ings.18' In Michael Zander's study of 282 cases at the Old Bailey in
1979, only twelve suspects, or roughly 4%, relied on the right to re-
main silent; of those, nine were convicted.182 In 1980, Baldwin and
McConville studied 1000 cases from Birmingham Crown Court and
476 cases from Crown Courts in London, and found that only 3.8% of
the Birmingham sample and 6.5% of the London sample made no
statement. 183 In McKenzie and Irving's 1988 study, the authors ob-
served interviews of sixty-eight suspects in the same police station in
each of two successive years. Eleven percent of their 1986 sample, and
15% their 1987 sample remained silent in response to some or all
questions. The authors also reviewed the files of 100 completed cases,
and found that 16% of suspects remained silent in response to some
or all questions. 184 In Sanders' 1989 study of 500 cases, 2.8% of sus-
pects were silent, while 5.3% denied involvement in the offense with-
out explanation. Thirty-eight percent made denials with some
explanation, while 54% made admissions. 185
Two recent studies likely overestimate the extent to which sus-
pects remain silent. McConville and Hodgson's 1992 study examined
the effects of the presence of counsel on suspects' use of silence, and
also provided data on the general use of the right to silence. The
authors attended 159 interviews, and found that 2.5% of the suspects
did not answer any questions, while 27% were selectively silent. This
number includes, however, suspects who only temporarily used si-
lence, suspects who were silent in response to irrelevant questions,
and suspects who refused to answer questions about others' involve-
179 LENG, supra note 5, at 10-14; Mitchell, supra note 166, at 597-600.
180 LENG, supra note 5, at 10-14; Mitchell, supra note 166, at 597-600.
181 Mitchell, supra note 166, at 597, 600 ("of the 394 defendants who were formally ques-
tioned, only 17 (4.3%) exercised their right of silence at any stage").
182 LENG, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing Michael Zander, The Investigation of Crime: A
Study of the Cases Tried at the Old Bailey, C.L.R. 203, 211-12 (1979)).
183 Id. (discussing Baldwin and McConville, Confessions in Crown Court Trials, ROYAL
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STUDY No. 5, 1980).
184 Id. at 13 (discussing McKenzie and Irving, Police Interrogation: The Effects of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Police Foundation (1989)).
185 Id. at 11-12 (discussing A. Sanders, et al., Advice and assistance at police stations and the
24 hour duty solicitor scheme, Lord Chancellor's Department (1989)).
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ment in a crime.186 Baldwin's 1992 study reviewed 400 videotaped
and 200 tape recorded interrogations, and found that 1.7% of sus-
pects did not answer any questions, while another 18% were selec-
tively silent. As in McConville and Hodgson's study, this number
included suspects who only temporarily used silence, those who were
silent in response to irrelevant questions, and those who refused to
answer questions about the involvement of others. In addition, the
author of this study did not claim to have used a representative sam-
ple, as it was up to the police to elect which cases to record.' 8 7
The Study avoided many of the flaws of the earlier studies. It also
broadened the scope of its examination to consider issues raised by
the system of adverse inferences adopted in Northern Ireland under
the Order, and later included in Major's plan.' 8 The Study divided
the use of silence into four categories. The first consisted of suspects
who remained totally silent and offered no response to any substantial
questions. The second consisted of suspects who answered some ques-
tions, but refused to answer some substantive questions about their
own or someone else's involvement in a crime. The third category
covered the ambush defense, which had been addressed by the Order.
It applied to suspects who denied the offense, failed to offer or dis-
close to the police a defense when given an opportunity to do so, and
then raised a defense during pre-trial negotiations or at trial. The
fourth category covered unexplained facts and other situations ad-
dressed in the Northern Ireland Order. It applied to suspects who
denied the offense, but failed to explain something incriminating
when given the opportunity to do so.189 The Study avoided overesti-
mating the use of the right to remain silent by not including the fol-
lowing situations as examples of the use of the right to silence: cases
where suspects at first refused to answer some questions, but answered
all substantial questions by the end of the interview; cases where sus-
pects refused to answer some questions substantially the same as ques-
tions already answered; and cases where suspects answered all
questions about themselves, but refused to answer questions about
others' involvement. 190
The Study examined 848 cases in which interviews took place,
and found that suspects remained silent in a small percentage of
186 Id. at 14 (discussing McConville and Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to
Silence, 1992 (a report prepared for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice)).
187 Id. at 15 (discussing Baldwin, The Role of Legal Representatives at Police Stations, 1992 (a
report prepared for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice)).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 15.
190 Id. at 16.
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cases. In thirty-eight of these cases, or 4.5%, suspects remained com-
pletely silent. In another eleven cases, or 1.3%, suspects at first re-
fused to answer, but eventually answered all substantial questions.' 9 '
These results correspond with Yeo's Singapore study, which examined
suspects' use of silence both before and after Singapore adopted ad-
verse inferences, and found that almost all suspects studied before the
amendment-93.4%-had responded to police questioning.
192
The great majority of suspects answer police questions, and a siza-
ble number actually confess. For instance, in Mitchell's study, over
70% confessed, and another 14%, while not making a full confession,
made incriminating statements. 193 In Zander's study, 76% confessed,
as did over one-half of the suspects studied by Baldwin and McCon-
nell. 94 These results clearly refute the contention that the right is
being "[w]idely exploited by professional criminals and their lawyers
to impede the search for truth.'
95
B. WILL ADVERSE INFERENCES REDUCE SILENCE DURING
INTERROGATION?
Proponents of using adverse inferences assert that such measures
will induce suspects to talk to police, to confess, and to reveal their
defenses during interrogation, allowing the police to use interroga-
tion techniques to break down their stories.' 9 6 The limited evidence
available, however, contradicts these claims. The Study examined
whether the police frequently gain a significant advantage when sus-
pects reveal their defenses, and the Study found that this advantage
occurs in only a small percentage of cases. Of the 848 suspects inter-
viewed, 314 (37%) raised a defense.'9 7 In 296 (94% of cases in which
suspects raised a defense), the police availed themselves of the sus-
pect's advanced disclosure, and tried to "break down" or rebut the
191 Id. at 17.
192 Yeo found that 57 of his sample of 61 suspects talked to the police, and that the
other four were members of a secret society who had been charged in the same offense.
Yeo, supra note 13, at 93. This result is not surprising in view of the fact that studies in
England have produced similar results. Yeo cited two English studies which had come to
similar conclusions. Id. at 93. More recently, studies have found that suspects' use of the
right to silence had little or no impact on charges, prosecutions, or conviction. For a
discussion of recent studies, see Greer, supra note 18, at 711 nn.12-13 and accompanying
text.
193 Mitchell, supra note 166, at 598-99.
194 Id. at 599.
195 Charles Pollard, Stop Protecting the Guilty and Abusing the Innocent, THE SUNDAY TIMES,
April 24, 1994, § 4, at 7 (guest editorial by the Chief Constable); REPORT, supra note 5, at
51. Indeed, not only is the right rarely used, but "[t]here is no evidence which shows
conclusively that silence is used disproportionately by professional criminals." Id. at 54.
196 REPORT, supra note 5, at 50-51; LENG, supra note 5, at 59-60.
197 See generally LENG, supra note 5, at 59-69.
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suspect's defense.19 8 They succeeded in twelve instances, and had
partial success in four others. If combined, this comes to only 5.4% of
the cases in which the suspect raised a defense. 199
Moreover, Yeo's study of the use of adverse inferences in Singa-
pore indicates that allowing adverse inferences does not cut down on
the use of the right, induce a significant number of suspects to talk to
the police, or increase confessions. Yeo's findings indicate that by al-
lowing adverse inferences, Singapore did not significantly alter sus-
pects' responsiveness to police questioning. All fifty-eight suspects in
Yeo's post-amendment sample answered police questions, 20 0 as stated,
but 93.4% had done so before the amendment.20 Yeo also found no
increases in either full or qualified confessions, but did find an in-
crease in denials.20 2 This contradicts the theory that the amendment
would cause suspects to confess more frequently.20 3 Yeo concluded
that at the five year mark, the amendment's aim had not been met.
The number of confessions had not increased, largely because sus-
pects rarely invoked their right to silence before the amendment.
20 4
C. DOES SILENCE CAUSE POLICE TO DROP CHARGES?
Proponents of limiting the right to remain silent argue that its
use forces the police to drop a large number of cases.20 5 The Study
examined this argument by reviewing the 268 cases, out of the total
sample of 848 cases, in which the police formally decided to take no
further action (NFA). 20 6 In the majority of NFA cases, about 62%, the
police were satisfied with the outcome.20 7 In most of these cases, the
reason why the police were satisfied was because they believed the sus-
pect was not guilty. This occurred in 114 (43%) of the cases.
20 8
Twenty-four (9%) of these cases were dismissed for "policy" reasons,
where proof was not a problem. These cases included cases dismissed
to reward informers or to avoid exposing mistakes or improper con-
198 Id. at 61-62.
199 Id. at 62.
200 Yeo, supra note 13, at 93.
201 Id.; see supra note 197 and accompanying text. For a discussion of recent studies, see
Greer, supra note 96, at 711 nn.12-13 and accompanying text.
202 Yeo found that before the amendment, of his sample of 57 cases, full confessions
were had in 26, qualified confessions in 15, and denials in 16. Of his sample of 58 post-
amendment cases, full confessions were had in 20 cases, qualified confessions in 11, and
denials in 27. Yeo, supra note 13, at 94.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 LENG, supra note 5, at 23.
206 Id. at 23-24.




duct by the police.20 9 In twenty-five cases, or about 9%, victims dis-
missed complaints.2
10
Of the 268 NFA cases the police were not pleased to dismiss,
ninety-four (35%) involved suspects who did not remain silent, but
who denied the accusation.211 Suspects remained silent in only nine
(4%) of the NFA cases. In four of these, the dismissal was for reasons
other than a lack of evidence.21 2 That leaves five cases, or about 2% of
NFA cases, where dismissal could be attributed to silence. 213 These
figures indicate that the right of silence is not causing the police to
dismiss a significant number of cases.
D. DOES SILENCE CAUSE PROSECUTORS TO DISMISS CASES OR COURTS
TO ACQUIT SUSPECTS?
Proponents of eliminating the right to remain silent have con-
tended that a substantial number of accused persons are acquitted
because they remain silent. To test this contention, the Study ex-
amined the 490 suspects who were charged with an offense out of the
848 originally interviewed. 214 Few suspects went free because the
prosecution dropped their cases or because a judge or jury acquitted
them. Only seventy-nine (16%) of the suspects who were charged had
their cases dropped by prosecutors, or were acquitted after contested
trials.21 5 Fifty-four (11%) of these suspects had their cases dropped by
the prosecution; twenty-five (5%) suspects were acquitted by a jury
after a contested trial.
216
Still fewer suspects had their charges dropped or were acquitted
because they remained silent. For instance, of the fifty-four cases
dropped by the prosecution, twelve were dropped for policy reasons.
This included cases where the prosecutor dropped trivial charges,
cases where the suspect was already facing a long term of imprison-
ment for other charges, and cases where the prosecution sought to
use the suspect as a witness. In eight cases, the prosecutor dropped
charges for technical reasons. This included cases where a mistake by
209 Id. at 24-26.
210 Id, at 24-25.
211 Id. at 24, 26-28, 30-31, 34.
212 Id, at 24, 27-29.
213 Id. at 27, 34. These cases included one where the victim would not appear for trial,
one where the police declined to proceed because the suspect had already been sentenced
for other offenses, one where the suspect was a teenager who was already being punished
by school authorities, and one where the police were satisfied that someone else was guilty.
I. at 27. One percent of dismissed cases were not classified. Id. at 24.
214 Id. at 37-38.




police or prosecutors made it impossible to proceed.217 The prosecu-
tion dropped thirty-three cases for insufficient evidence. The suspect,
however, remained silent in only five of the thirty-three cases. Even if
the prosecutor's decision to drop these five cases-out of the 490
where charges were brought-was attributable to the accused's si-
lence, the use of adverse inferences would likely make little differ-
ence. This is true because, in most of the cases that the prosecutor
dropped, other evidence was "thin or non-existent."218 Suspects could
thus deny their involvement without contradiction by independent ev-
idence, and avoid an adverse inference.
219
Few of the suspects which a jury acquitted relied on silence. Of
the twenty-five suspects acquitted by a jury, seventeen (68%) raised
their defense during the police interview. 220 Three suspects raised
their defense for the first time in court.2 21 In three cases, suspects
were acquitted after exercising their right to silence at a police inter-
view. Because of the absence of other evidence, however, the prosecu-
tion's ability to invite adverse inferences would have made little
difference. Suspects could have denied their involvement without
contradiction by independent evidence, and thus could have avoided
any adverse inference.
222
E. DOES SILENCE INCREASE THE USE OF THE AMBUSH DEFENSE?
Advocates of the use of adverse inferences have argued that it
would remedy the allegedly significant problem caused by the "am-
bush" defense, in which suspects remain silent during interrogation,
and do not reveal any details of their defense until trial. They believe
that the ambush defense prevents the police and the prosecution
from investigating the defense and preparing *a rebuttal.223 To rem-
edy this perceived problem, Major's new law will allow such adverse
inferences "as appear proper" to be drawn when the accused does not
217 Id.
218 Id. at 39. In two additional cases, the suspect initially refused to answer questions,
but later answered all substantial questions. Their initial refusal to talk was not linked to
the prosecution's decision to drop charges. Id. at 38-39.
219 Id. at 43.
220 Id. at 40 (In two instances, suspects' cases were dismissed because of prosecution
delay).
221 Id. at 45-58.
222 Id. at 41-43. Earlier studies indicated that "Silence was not an effective bar to convic-
tion." Dixon, supra note 13, at 37. In Zander's study, only a quarter of the number of
silent suspects were acquitted. Id. at 37 (discussing Michael Zander, The Investigation of
Crime, 1979 CaM. L. Rxv. 203, 211-12).
223 LENG, supra note 5, at 45; Jackson, supra note 10, at 405. (noting that, previously, the
court could invite an inference under these circumstances if the parties could be said to be
on equal footing during the interrogation or interview).
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reveal during interrogation any fact relied upon in their defense at
trial. 224
The Study, however, found that claims about the extent of the
problem are exaggerated, in part because of very broad definitions of
the ambush defense, which include cases where the prosecution is not
unfairly surprised.225 Many defenses not raised until trial are not ex-
amples of the ambush defense. Examples of this include claims that
the suspect's alleged conduct does not amount to the charged of-
fense; procedural defenses, such as double jeopardy and challenges to
the admissibility of evidence; and simple denials of an element or ele-
ments of the prosecution's case, which are made without the introduc-
tion of evidence. 2
26
To avoid including such cases as examples of the ambush de-
fense, the Study defined the ambush defense as follows: the defense is
first raised at trial; it takes the prosecution by surprise; the defendant
could have disclosed the evidence or explanation to the police during
the interrogation; the prosecution suffers as a result of the surprise;
the accused may have an unfair advantage because they have had ad-
ditional time to prepare their story or those of witnesses; the risk of
the suspect being wrongfully acquitted is greater than it would have
been had the suspect disclosed the defense at the interrogation; and
finally, the defense is false.2 27 The Study also did not consider cases to
involve an ambush defense if the police did not give the suspects
enough information about their suspicions to indicate which facts
about their defense might be relevant to reveal; if the police did not
give the suspects a chance to reveal the facts relied upon in their de-
fense; or if the suspects were unaware during interrogation of the po-
tential for raising a defense.
228
To determine how often suspects used the ambush defense, the
Study examined the cases in its sample in which a suspect was
charged, but did not plead guilty. It compared the trial records with
the prosecutor's file, and other information collected from the prose-
cutors and police officers involved in the case, to determine if the
224 The inference is permissible if, under the circumstances, one could have been "rea-
sonably expected" to mention the fact. Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 34. See also LENG,
supra note 5, at 46. This section was also adopted in Clause 3 of the Northern Ireland
Order. See supra note 143.
225 LENG, supra note 5, at 50.
226 Id. at 48-49. An affirmative defense, such as self-defense, requires the accused to
introduce some evidence and could therefor constitute an ambush. Such a defense is char-
acterized in the Study as a "defense proper." Id. at 49.
227 Id. at 47. According to the Study, these characteristics have been used by a number
of commentators. Id. (citing S. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (1991)).
228 LENG, supra note 5, at 50.
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defense raised at trial had been disclosed during interrogation. This
comparison revealed that juries acquitted twenty-five of the fifty-nine
suspects whose cases went to trial. Seventeen (68%) of the acquitted
suspects raised their defenses during interrogation. The high per-
centage of those acquitted who had disclosed their defense under-
mines the theory that suspects have a significant incentive to withhold
evidence in order to ambush the prosecution at trial and gain
acquittal.2
29
In the other eight jury acquittals, suspects raised a defense in
court that they did not mention to the police during interrogation.
None of these cases, however, met the criteria for an ambush de-
fense.2 30 The Study also found that defendants did not use the am-
bush defense in any of the fifty-four cases that were dropped,231 and
that of thirty-four suspects found guilty, only one clearly used the am-
bush defense, although obviously to little effect.2 32 The Study's re-
sults-no suspects using the ambush defense were acquitted or had
their cases dropped, and a jury convicted the one suspect who raised
the ambush defense-contradicts the theory that suspects frequently
use the ambush defense to gain acquittal.2 33 This confirms similar
findings by McConville and Baldwin, whose study indicated that am-
bush defenses were rarely responsible for acquittals.
23 4
F. WILL ADVERSE INFERENCES LIMIT SILENCE AT TRIAL AND "FREQUENT"
ACQUITTALS?
Proponents of limiting the right to silence have contended that
the accused's refusal to testify at trial causes the same problem suppos-
edly caused by silence during interrogation-the guilty frequently
avoid conviction. 23 5 To remedy this supposed problem, the second
section of Major's new law essentially adopts the CLRC recommenda-
tion to allow such adverse inferences "as appear proper" to be drawn
229 Id. at 51.
230 Id. at 51-53.
231 Id. at 54. In only one of the dropped cases was a defense raised at trial which appar-
ently had not been raised during interrogation. This was not, however, an ambush de-
fense. Id.
232 Id. at 50-51, 55, 58. In two other cases where the suspect was found guilty, the prose-
cution claimed that the defense used the ambush defense, but the defense denied it. In
this sample, the defense was used in, at most, 5% of contested trials. Id. at 58.
233 Id. at 55-57. Many unanticipated defenses are the consequence of police interroga-
tion techniques which are designed to exclude exculpatory statements by the suspect. Id.
234 Dixon, supra note 13, at 37 (discussingJohn Baldwin and Michael McConville, Confes-
sions in the Crown Courts Trials, The Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure, Research Study
No. 5, 112, 117-25, London HMO 30 (1980).
235 LENG, supra note 5, at 4-5, 37.
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from the accused's failure to testify at trial.23 6 Some proponents of
using adverse inferences have argued that this will foster testimony by
the accused and allow their stories to be tested by cross examina-
tion.23 7 While the Study's sample provided no cases which allowed an
evaluation of the use of silence at trial, the proponents' arguments
seem no more convincing in the context of limiting the right at trial
than they were in the context of limiting the right during
interrogation.
There is no indication that the right to silence is frequently used
at trial or that it allows many suspects to go free. In Singapore, Yeo
found that few accused persons refused to testify at trial before Singa-
pore's judicial system permitted adverse inferences.238 His study re-
vealed that suspects refused to testify in only twelve out of 185 pre-
amendment cases. Seventeen suspects made unsworn statements
under a pre-amendment rule which allowed the accused to offer un-
sworn testimony at trial and avoid cross-examination; and 156, or
84.3%, testified.2 39 The findings indicate that the assertion that si-
lence is frequently used at trial to gain acquittal is exaggerated, be-
cause the accused rarely remain silent at trial.
Similarly, using adverse inferences would not foster testimony by
the accused. Yeo examined 115 post-amendment cases, tried after the
courts began to inform the accused of the adverse inferences that
could be drawn if they refused to testify.240 Of this group, 89.1% testi-
fied. This increase of less than five percentage points from the per-
centage of those who testified prior to adverse inferences hardly
seems significant, especially since Yeo did not include those who of-
fered unsworn testimony in the calculations. Had he included them,
the results would indicate that a higher percentage of accused persons
testified at their trials before the amendment.241 According to Yeo,
after five years in operation, the amendments had "not materially as-
sisted" the police and prosecutors.2 42 They did not induce accused
236 Public Order Act, supra note 2, § 35. The CLRC report recommended that adverse
inferences should be drawn if, after a prima fade case had been established, the accused
person failed to testify at trial. Public Order Act, supra note 9, 108-113 and Appendix,
cl. 5 of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill, cited in Leng, supra note 5, at 2; Haw Tua Tau v.
P.P., 3 All E.R. 14, 18-19 (1981), cited in Yeo, supra note 13, at 97-98; section 1 (b) of the
Criminal Evidence Act (N.I.).
237 LENG, supra note 5, at 78-79. Proponents have argued that the accused's silence at
trial deprives the jury of the opportunity to hear their story tested by cross examination.
Id.
238 Yeo, supra note 13, at 96-97.
239 Id. at 97-99.
240 Id. at 96-97.
241 Id. at 98-99.
242 Id. at 100.
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persons to confess more often or to testify in court, and they did not
have a significant impact on judicial proceedings.
2 43
Proponents of limiting the right to silence at trial have offered no
evidence to support their claims that the accused frequently used si-
lence at trial to gain acquittal, or that the use of adverse inferences
would cure this supposed problem. In fact, the Singapore experience
suggests that defendants do not usually use silence at trial, and that
adverse inferences do not increase testimony by the accused.
G. WILL LIMITING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE REDUCE CRIME?
Proponents of limiting the right to remain silent argue that, by
doing so, they will force more suspects to talk to the police, to confess,
and to testify at trial. This, they argue, will increase convictions and
thereby reduce crime. However, there is no convincing evidence that
this is true. In fact, the evidence suggests that the use of adverse infer-
ences will not reduce crime.
244
Silence is not a serious impediment to the police in solving
crimes. Suspects remain silent in only a small percentage of cases. In
the Study's sample, only 4.5% remained silent245 and, in Yeo's Singa-
pore study, 6.6% of the pre-amendment suspects did not respond to
police questioning.2 46 Thus, even without the threat of adverse infer-
ences, suspects frequently responded to police interrogation.
Further, while studies indicate that one-half to three-quarters of
suspects now confess, 247 Yeo found that the use of adverse inferences
actually increased denials.2 48 This runs counter to the theory that the
amendment would cause suspects to confess more often,249 and lends
weight to the Study's conclusion that adverse inferences would not
increase confessions. 250 Moreover, the Study showed that the use of
adverse inferences does not significantly aid the police in solving
crime by breaking down suspects' stories, as this occurred in only a
small percentage of cases.251 Even if one considers the use of silence a
243 Id. at 100-01. Yeo concluded that England might someday allow adverse inferences
from the accused's failure to testify at trial, but that the Singapore experience offered no
evidence to support diminishing the right to silence at police interrogation in England.
To the contrary, Yeo cited the 1981 Royal Commission Report to argue that such a change
would lead to an inquisitorial criminal justice system. Id. at 101 (citing Report of the Royal
Comm'n on Criminal Procedure, Jan. 1981, Cmnd. 8092, 4.59).
244 See supra notes 238 to 256 and accompanying text.
245 LFNG, supra note 5, at 17, 20; REPORT, supra note 5, at 53.
246 See supra note 192.
247 Mitchell, supra note 166, at 598-99; REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
248 See supra note 213.
249 Yeo, supra note 13, at 95.
250 LENG, supra note 5, at 79-80.
251 Id. at 62. They succeeded in whole or in part in only 5.4% of the cases where a
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problem, adopting adverse inferences is not a remedy. In Yeo's study,
for example, the percentage of suspects who talked to the police did
not change significantly after Singapore allowed adverse inferences.
2 52
The right to silence does not hinder efforts to solve crime by
causing the police to drop a significant number of cases.253 For exam-
ple, in the Study's sample of 848 cases, the police formally decided to
take no further action in 268 cases.254 However, the suspect's silence
was a factor in only 5 (2%) of these cases. 2 55 Further, the suspect's
silence rarely caused the prosecution to drop a case2 56 and in the few
cases where the suspect's silence did cause the prosecutor to drop the
case, the evidence was usually weak. The use of adverse inferences
would most likely have made little difference in these cases because
the accused could have simply denied the charge without adverse in-
ferences being drawn and without fear of contradiction by the
prosecution.
Also, those who exercise their right are as likely to be charged as
those who do not.2 57 In fact, the study conducted by Williamson and
Moston indicated that silence had no effect on the police's decisions
to charge a suspect where the evidence was either weak or strong, but
that in borderline cases, the police were more likely to charge suspects
who remained silent.2 58 Further, as the Royal Commission's Study in-
dicated, few suspects are acquitted in court because they remain si-
lent.2 59 In fact, Williamson and Moston found that suspects who had
defense was raised. Id.
252 Yeo, supra note 13, at 93. Yeo found that by allowing adverse inferences, Singapore
did not significantly alter suspects' responsiveness to police questioning.
253 LENG, supra note 5, at 23.
254 Id. at 23-24.
255 Id. at 28; see supra note 213.
256 Id. at 39. The prosecution dropped 33 cases for insufficient evidence. In only 5 of
the 33 cases, however, did the suspect remain silent. Even if the prosecutor's decision to
drop these five cases-out of the 490 where charges were brought-could be attributable
to the accused's silence, the use of adverse inferences would most likely make little differ-
ence. This is true because, in most of the cases in question, other evidence was "thin or
non-existent." Id.
257 REPORT, supra note 5, at 53.
258 Id (citing T. WILLIAMSON AND S. MOSTON, POLICE INvESTIGATION STYLES AND SUSPECT
BEHAVIOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE POLICE REQUIREMENTS SUPPORT UNIT, Univ. of Kent Insti-
tute of Social and Applied Psychology, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1993)).
259 LENG, supra note 5, at 37-38, 40-43. In the Study's sample of 848 cases, 490 suspects
were charged. Twenty-five of these suspects (5%) were acquitted by ajury after a contested
trial. Of the 25, 17 (68%) raised their defense during the police interview. In three cases,
suspects were acquitted after exercising their right to silence at a police interview. Because
of the absence of other evidence, however, the prosecution's ability to invite adverse infer-
ences would have made little difference because suspects could have denied their involve-




remained silent were convicted at a higher rate than suspects who did
not.260 It also seems unlikely that the use of adverse inferences will
cause more suspects to testify. Yeo's Singapore study found that the
accused had rarely remained silent at trial before adverse inferences
were allowed, and that the use of adverse inferences did not increase
testimony by the accused.
261
The weight of evidence supports the conclusion of the Royal
Commission's Study, that adverse inferences would not increase con-
victions. 262 However, even if the use of adverse inferences would in-
crease conviction rates, it would have little effect on crime. Over 90%
of the cases which come to court end in conviction.263 An increase in
this percentage would have little impact on crime. More significant
crime control issues are how to catch the criminals who avoid detec-
tion and apprehension, and how to prevent persons from becoming
criminals and committing crimes.
The supposed problems with the use of the right to silence are
greatly exaggerated and the promised benefits of curtailing the right
are an illusion. Silence does not cause the police to drop a significant
number of cases, allow a significant number of suspects to gain acquit-
tal in court, or increase the use of the ambush defense. Moreover,
promises that the use of adverse inferences will increase testimony by
the accused, or reduce crime, are empty.
VI. ADVERSE INFERENCES WILL UNDERMINE THE AccusAToRIAL
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MOVE IT TOWARDS AN
INQUIsITORIAL MODEL
While the benefits of using adverse inferences are illusory, the
costs are real. The use of adverse inferences will erode or eliminate
the right to silence and, in doing so, shift the burden of proof to the
accused, in some cases reduce the prosecution's burden of proof, and
weaken or remove the presumption of innocence. These changes will
undermine the accusatorial system ofjustice, moving the criminal jus-
tice system towards an inquisitorial model. Many of the benefits of the
accusatorial system which these changes will jeopardize are character-
istic of an open and democratic society, including a strictly limited
260 REPORT, supra note 5, at 53 (citing T. Williamson and S. Moston, The Extent of Silence
in Police Interiews, in THE RIGHT OF SILENCE DEBATE (Steven Greer and R. Morgan, eds.,
1990)). According to prosecution barristers, 41% of those who had been silent were ac-
quitted compared to 49% of those who had answered police questions. The defense barris-
ter also indicated that 41% of those who had remained silent were acquitted compared to
54% of those who talked to the police.
261 Yeo, supra note 13, at 96-99.
262 LENG, supra note 5, at 79-80.
263 Silence, supra note 6, 17-18.
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government, restrained in its ability to compromise individual dignity,
privacy, and autonomy.
A. UNDERMINING THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
When a judicial system allows adverse comment on or adverse in-
ferences from the suspect's silence, it erodes or eliminates the right to
silence. The United States Supreme Court recognized this when it
found that adverse comment "is a penalty imposed by courts for exer-
cising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by mak-
ing its assertion costly."264 Major's new law will exact a penalty-the
inference of guilt-from silence, and effectively impose a duty to talk
on suspects. The substitution of a duty to talk for a right to silence has
serious implications. It shifts the criminal justice system from its accu-
satorial focus on proof by witnesses and extrinsic evidence towards an
inquisitorial system's focus on the interrogation of suspects.
Adverse inferences undermine both the presumption of inno-
cence and the burden of proof, concepts which are logically related.
The burden of proof requires the prosecution to persuade the jury of
the accused's guilt; the presumption of innocence allows the accused
to "remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its
burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion.. ."265 The
presumption of innocence, however, also conveys to the jury the warn-
ing that in its deliberations, it may rely on "nothing but the evidence,
i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused."
266
Major's law shifts the burden of proof to the accused by making
them talk to the police during interrogation, and then go forward
with evidence through their own testimony. If the defendants fail to
carry this burden by remaining silent, the court will penalize them
with an inference of guilt.2 67 Imposing a burden on suspects to pres-
ent their explanation, and sanctioning them for the failure to do so,
resembles the confession "pro confesso," by which silent suspects were
treated as if they had confessed.2 68 Supporters of Major's new law
claimed, as did supporters of the old inquisitorial method, that the
innocent have nothing to hide, and that only the guilty would refuse
to answer.2 69
264 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
265 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12 (1978) (quoting 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
407 (3d ed. 1940)).
266 Id. at 485 (quoting 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 11 and 12; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
268 LEVw, supra note 25, at 23-24.
269 For the views of proponents of this justification for the confession pro confesso, see
LEVY, supra note 25, at 269, 270-71. Jeremy Bentham was a noted supporter of this view.
"silence ... by common sense, as the report of universal experience, [is] certified to be
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Major's new law will also effectively lower the government's bur-
den of proof. Under the new law, if the prosecution establishes a
prima facie case-even if it falls short of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt-the accused will have to testify. If the accused refuses to tes-
tify, the prosecutor's case will be bolstered by an inference of the ac-
cused's guilt. This effectively lowers the prosecution's burden of
proof to showing a prima facie case.
2 70
Adverse inferences also undermine the presumption of inno-
cence by forcing suspects to explain away their alleged involvement in
a crime. The accused's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation
gives rise to the inference that there is no explanation and that the
accused is guilty.2 71 Such an inference contradicts the presumption of
innocence by allowing verdicts based not on the evidence, but on "sur-
mises based on the present situation of the accused."
272
B. MOVE TOWARDS AN INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, "comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice' .. ."273 By adopting this remnant,
England has reversed three-hundred years of progress towards the ac-
cusatorial system, with its reliance on independent witnesses and ex-
trinsic evidence, and reverted back to the inquisitorial system, with its
tantamount to confession..." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 39 (John
Bowring ed., ed. V. 11 1818). Bentham believed interrogation to be "the most efficient,
and [in case of doubt] the indispensable, instrument for the extraction of truth..." Id. In
announcing the proposal to eliminate the right to silence, Home Secretary Michael How-
ard argued that "the innocent have nothing to hide." NATURE, Oct. 14, 1993, at 591, 592.
Judge David Miller has postulated that "[ijf an accused person has a defence [sic], what
possible objection can there be to disclosing it as soon as possible?" David Miller, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1994, at 8 (editorial). Keith Harvey has argued that "[r]equiring sus-
pects to provide explanations for their actions, and inferring an element of guilt when they
fail to do so, is a more accurate reflection of reality. . ." Keith Harvey, THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 19, 1994, at 8 (editorial).
270 Jackson, supra note 8, at 108-09. The reasoning of the Murray opinion, which upheld
a "common sense" approach to adverse inferences, could according to the author, under-
mine the accusatorial system: "The traditional conception of the accusatorial criminal trial
is that it is more than an inquiry into the accused's guilt. It is a demonstration by the
prosecution of the accused's guilt, and it is arguably inconsistent with the principle that it
is for the prosecution to demonstrate the accused's guilt to allow the accused's refusal to
participate in the trial by testifring to play a part in the demonstration." Id. In its Report,
the Royal Commission concluded that eliminating the right to silence would reduce the
prosecution's burden of proof. REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
271 See supra notes 155 to 156 and accompanying text.
272 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (quoting 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 407 (3d
ed. 1940)).
273 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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reliance on obtaining suspects' confessions through interrogation. 27 4
England witnessed the operation of the inquisitorial system ad-
ministered by ecclesiastical courts and by the Crown's High Commis-
sion and Star Chamber. This system relied on forcing suspects to
incriminate themselves, generally under oath, through proceedings
which did not require accusers, but which often relied on secret in-
formers. 275 Suspects who refused to incriminate themselves were
either treated as if they had confessed, or imprisoned.276
Modem inquisitorial systems have, in large measure, retained this
focus on obtaining suspects' confessions through interrogation. For
instance, in Italy, investigatory detention may last up to forty-eight
hours, during which time the police may deny access to counsel.2 77
This period may be extended in the event of major offenses and when
it is reasonable to believe that the suspect may flee.2 78 The lengthy
detention of suspects for investigation and interrogation has raised
questions about possible abuses. For instance, it has allegedly been
used to coerce suspects to confess and has gained international atten-
tion after a number of prominent suspects in a corruption investiga-
tion committed suicide while in detention.2 79
Modem inquisitorial systems also allow magistrates to question
suspects at a preliminary examination to decide whether or not to
274 Justice Frankfurter pointed out the protection the right afforded against inquisitorial
procedures: "Time has not shown that protection from the evils against which this safe-
guard was directed is needless or unwarranted .... No doubt the constitutional privilege
may, on occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more far-
reaching evil-the recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their
stark brutality." Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426, 428 (1956).
275 LEw, supra note 25, at 23; see also WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 275.
276 LEVY, supra note 25, at 23-24, 132, 142-43, 150, 156, 179.
277 An Overview ofItalian Justice AM. LAWYER, Mar. 1993, at 80 ("Fortunately for prosecu-
tors, the Italian Parliament has passed several amendments to the 1989 code, eliminating
many of the new rights of the accused criminals, such as giving notice to defense lawyers
immediately after arrest. Police can now hold and question suspects for 48 hours without
notifying their lawyers.").
278 Ennio Amodio et al., An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country: The Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure 62 TEMP. L. Q. 1211, 1218 n.24 and accompanying text (discussing ITAL-
IAN CODE OF CIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 253, 384 (1988)).
279 Giuseppe Di Federico, The Crisis of thejudicial System and the Referendum on theJudiciary
in ITALIAN PoLImcs: A REvIEw 29-33 (Robert Leonardi & Piergiorgio Corbetta eds., 3d ed.
1989). Italy's jaied Energy Chief Found Dead in Cell, N.Y. TIME, July 21, 1993, at A3 (after the
suicides of a number of suspects in detention, Milan prosecutors were alleged to have used
pretrial detention to force suspects to confess and to testify against co-conspirators);JoHN
TAGULAUE, In a Courtroom in Milan, Italian Society is on Tria N.Y. Tnems, February 6, 1994, at
A3 ("the annual human rights report of the United States State Department recently criti-
cized [a prosecutor's] use of the preventative imprisonment to coax confessions from sus-
pects."). Detention has also been used to elicit confessions in Germany, according to
Damaska. DAMASKA, supra note 19, at 167; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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charge the suspect,28 0 and allow the government to call the accused as
a witness at trial. For instance, under Italy's inquisitorial "Code
Rocco," which was crafted during the Fascist era and remained in ef-
fect for almost fifty years, interrogation of the accused was the first
event at trial.281 Often, those systems allow the trier of fact to draw
adverse inferences from a suspect's refusal to answer questions.
282
Major's system of adverse inferences will foster the same focus on
interrogation and confessions as existing inquisitional systems. The
suspect will not have a right to silence, but a duty to talk; the burden
of proof will shift from the government to the accused; the presump-
tion of innocence will become an assumption of guilt, to be overcome
only by the accused's explanation. These principles harken back to
the confession pro confesso, and convey the same message: that the
government has the power to interrogate suspects, and the suspects
have the duty to talk, and to help to convict themselves.
2 83
English police have sought to gain other powers characteristic of
an inquisitorial system. For instance, police have suggested adopting
the use of Italian-style investigating magistrates to "cross-examine ter-
rorist suspects," and to make it a crime if a suspect refuses to answer a
magistrate's question.28 4 Other suggestions have included charging
people with a crime if they refuse to account to the police for their
movements, shifting the burden of proof to the accused,285 allowing
280 MERRYMAN, supra note 98, at 130-31; DAMAsK, supra note 19, at 162.
281 The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continen-
tal Europe, 29 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 248-49, 269 (1991). Modem inquisitorial sys-
tems are noted for their focus on gaining evidence through the interrogation of the
accused, and for sometimes allowing investigating magistrates to take the lead in investigat-
ing crimes and questioning suspects. Many of these systems also give the same magistrate
adjudicatory power to resolve the case, not based on the evidence presented in court, but
based in large measure on the dossier which they have compiled through their own investi-
gation. MERRYMAN, supra note 98, at 130-31; LAFAvE & Israel, supra note 19, at 38.
282 MERRYMAN, supra note 98, at 130; BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, LAwS AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE UNITED
STATES 79 (1987) ("Therefore, [in France] not only the investigators but also the adjudica-
tors are likely to draw adverse conclusions as to guilt from a refusal to answer questions and
are not prevented by law from doing so."); DAmASKA, supra note 19, at 167 ("Judges can
legitimately draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's refusal to answer questions,
and it is easy to see reasons why Continental defendants who choose to exercise their right
to silence are few and far between.").
283 Under old inquisitorial procedure, if a suspect did not take the oath he would be
considered guilty "pro confesso--as if he had confessed. LEVY, supra note 25, at 23-24.
284 M15 Wants "Anti-Mafia" Laws to Crush Godfathers of IRA, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 20,
1994, §1, at 1 ("Security chiefs want to encourage hardened terrorists to confess and give
evidence against their leaders. They also want to punish those who do not co-operate.
One controversial proposal is to make it a crime for suspects to refuse to answer questions
by the special investigators.").
285 Andrew Grice et al., Major Urged to Bring Back Internment; THE SUNDAY TIMEs, Mar. 13,
1994, §1, at 3 ("The government is expected to reject proposals by Sir Hugh Annesley,
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the use of "first hand" hearsay evidence, 286 using secret prosecution
witnesses, and allowing the prosecution to keep information and in-
formants secret.287 Still other proposed measures include the exten-
sion of provisions which allow the detention of terrorist suspects for
up to ninety-six hours without charge under the "Prevention and Sup-
pression of Terrorism Act,"288 and proposals to limit suspects' right to
bail.28 9
By adopting the use of adverse inferences, England has moved
towards the inquisitorial systems of past and present. It has turned its
criminal justice system away from a reliance on independent witnesses
and extrinsic evidence, and towards a reliafice on obtaining suspects'
confessions through interrogation. If police efforts gain momentum,
the adoption of adverse inferences could be part of a larger trend
towards adopting a more complete set of inquisitorial procedures.
Such a transformation would likely follow the pattern established
when adverse inferences were adopted in Northern Ireland. The gov-
ernment would urge the adoption of those measures to fight terror-
ism and particularly grave offenses, but would quickly apply them to
the entire criminal justice system.
chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, for tougher measures including a new
offense under which people could be charged for refusing to account for their movements
to police."); Charles Pollard, Stop Protecting the Guilty and Abusing the Innocen, THE SUNDAY
TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1994, §4, at 7 (Mr. Pollard opposes the current allocation of the burden of
proof and the fact that "what is on trial is the accusation against the offender." He suggests
putting the "offender" on trial. His use of the word "offender" rather than "accused" high-
lights his assumption that the person on trial is presumed guilty.); "Anti-Mafia" Laws, supra
note 284. Contra Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (The Supreme Court struck
down as overbroad a California statute which required a person loitering on the streets to
provide credible and reliable identification in response to police questioning. The major-
ity found the statute unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encouraged arbitrary enforcement. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted that while a police officer may ask a citizen a
question, he may not compel an answer.).
286 Howard's Hash, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, §4, at 5 (editorial discussing a pro-
posal by Sir Hugh Annesley, chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary).
287 Michael Prescott et al., Home Office Moves to Protect Informers, THE SUNDAY TiMES, Apr.
17, 1994, §1, at 24 (proposal to allow prosecutors to disclose to the defense evidence which
"they think relevant to the defense, holding back items that would identify secret sources
or lead to witnesses becoming vulnerable to intimidation"). Another proposal would offer
witnesses to terrorist acts anonymity. "They would testify by video link or from behind
screens to prevent intimidation. Their identities would be withheld from defense lawyers."
"Anti-Mafia" Laws, supra note 284.
288 Time to Stop Wooing the IRA, THE SUNDAY TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1994, §4, at 5 (editorial).
289 Amendments to the right to bail appear in Public Order Act, supra note 2. The right
to bail pending trial corresponds to the presumption that the suspect is innocent until
proven guilty in court. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle,
would lose its meaning."); Scrivener, supra note 143 (editorial disapproving of the amend-
ments to the right to bail).
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C. EFFECTS OF THE MOVE TOWARDS AN INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM
England's shift towards inquisitorial methods jeopardizes many of
the benefits protected by the accusatorial system ofjustice. It loosens
the accusatorial system's limits on government's power to pry into the
"private enclave" of an individual's thoughts and conscience.2 90 It
also diminishes the accusatorial system's protection of individual au-
tonomy and free choice because, when suspected of a crime, individu-
als are no longer free to choose whether or not to provide the
government with evidence to aid in securing their own conviction;
they are bound to do so or face an inference of their guilt.291 The
move towards inquisitorial methods also undermines the accusatorial
system's protection of individuals from humiliation and abuse at the
hands of government investigators. The inquisitorial system tempts
law enforcement officers to use inhumane and unreliable methods to
obtain confessions-a temptation which has been the source of mis-
carriages of justice.292
The use of inquisitorial methods could increase the number of
innocent persons convicted. Adverse inferences give police an addi-
tional method of producing confessions. This could cause weak sus-
pects to confess to crimes which they did not commit.29 3 In addition,
the adverse inferences drawn from silence might be incorrect. Some
innocent people might remain silent during interrogation because
they are confused, or because they are unable or unprepared to pro-
duce a cogent explanation in the tense environment of a police inter-
rogation. Some innocent people might not be capable of offering
persuasive testimony from the witness stand, and in fact may further
incriminate themselves due to excessive nervousness or timidity.29 4
Moreover, not all suspects who remain silent do so because of their
guilt. Some remain silent to protect others. In the Royal Commis-
sion's Study, for instance, in twelve percent of the cases where sus-
pects remained silent, they did so to protect others.295 In each of
290 See supra note 104 and accompanying text; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12
(1966) (quoting U.S. v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1955) (Frank, J. dissenting)),
rev'd 353 U.S. 391 (1956).
291 See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
292 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
293 REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
294 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60, 66 (1893)). Regardless of innocence, persons previously convicted of crimes may
also shun the witness stand, aware that if they testify, the jury would be informed of their
prior conviction as impeachment evidence. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615 (quoting People v.
Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 762-63 (Cal. 1965)).
295 LENG, supra note 5, at 19-20. Of the 49 cases where suspects remained silent for some
or all of the interrogation, five suspects admitted their own involvement, yet remained
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these instances, an inference of guilt from silence could have resulted
in the conviction of an innocent person.
The recent move towards an inquisitorial system could also signal
a larger transformation in the relationship between the citizen and
the state. The accusatorial system protects many of the characteristics
of an open and democratic society-a strictly limited government, re-
strained in its ability to compromise individual dignity, autonomy, and
privacy. Citizens of an accusatorial system do not have to account for
themselves to the state. The state must prove them guilty of a crime
before taking away their liberty.2 96 The inquisitorial system is incon-
sistent with the inherent distrust of authority which helped shape lim-
ited and democratic government.
2 9 7
VII. CONCLUSION
While the law curtailing the right to silence in England might
appear "tough on crime," studies show that it will not, in fact, reduce
crime. It will, however, have significant effects on the criminal justice
system. The right to silence is an essential element of the accusatorial
system ofjustice. It prevents the operation of the engine which drives
the inquisitorial system-the power to require, encourage, or force
individuals to respond to government questioning. By adopting the
use of adverse inferences, England has curtailed the right to silence,
replaced it with a duty to talk, and moved back toward an inquisitorial
system. This trade of tangible liberty for the illusion or symbol of se-
curity will transform not only the criminal justice system, but also the
character of the relationship between the citizen and the state. While
some claim that the right to silence is a relic and urge the adoption of
adverse inferences and the inquisitorial system in the United States,
2 98
silent about the involvement of others. In another case, a suspect refused to answer ques-
tions after he was found in a van containing stolen goods. He was released when another
man later stepped forward to confess, and the police were satisfied that the original suspect
had nothing to do with the offense. Id.
296 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); see also WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 317
("The privilege [against self-incrimination] contributes toward a fair state-individual bal-
ance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load.").
297 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 19, at 43. See supra note 98 (discussing government of
limited, enumerated powers); ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTrru=ON 113
(6th ed. 1983); DAmAsKA, supra note 19.
298 Maechling, supra note 23, at 59.
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history remembers "the dangers of pursuing legal quests for instanta-
neous transformations, utopian solutions, or even short-term manipu-
lations that eventually might undermine the long-term goals of
American law,"299 and counsels against it.
299 Stephen B. Presser, "Legal History" or the History of Law: A Primer on Bringing the Law's
Past into the Present, 35 VAND. L. REv. 849, 852 (1982) (commenting on the role of the study
of legal history).
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